SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

1930 Supreme(Nagpur) 56

HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
Niyogi
CHHEDILAL – Appellant
Versus
MANOHARLAL – Respondent
Decided on : 08-07-1930

The judgment establishes the admissibility and enforceability of oral agreements and acknowledgments of liability in the context of debt recovery.

Headnote:

oral promise - recovery of debt - Evidence Act - Contract Act

Fact of the Case:

The respondent sued the appellant for the recovery of a debt based on an oral promise and acknowledgments of liability. The lower courts had conflicting decisions on the validity of the oral promise.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the oral agreement could be proved and enforced, dismissing the appeal and ordering the appellant to pay the respondent's costs.

Issues: Validity of oral promise, admissibility of oral evidence to vary terms of acknowledgment and promissory notes

Ratio Decidendi: The court analyzed the provisions of the Evidence Act and Contract Act to determine the admissibility and enforceability of the oral promise and acknowledgments.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the lower appellate court's finding that the oral agreement was proved.

JUDGMENT

Niyogi, A J C—The respondent Manoharlal sued the appellant for the recovery of Rs. 338-8-9 on the allegation that on two occasions amounts were advanced on promissory notes and once on oral promise to pay the money in the year 1918 and that the liability was acknowledged by defendant-appellant on 13th May 1921 which was in turn renewed by another acknowledgment on 10th April 1924. The respondent rested his claim not on the acknowledgment or on the promissory notes, but on oral promise made by the appellant at the time of the execration of the acknowledgment dated 10th April 1924. The Court of first instance held the oral promise to be disproved and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The learned District Judge on appeal came to a different conclusion and decreed the suit in full.

2. In second appeal it is contended that the oral agreement pleaded could not be proved in view of Section 92, Evidence Act. The learned pleader for the appellant contended that in view of the acknowledgment no oral evidence was admissible to vary the terms thereof, and the respondent relied on Proviso. (2) and Illus. (f) and (g) to Section 92, Evidence Act and contended that the evidence to prove an independent oral agreement was admissible. He relied on Ibrahim v. Lali Mohan, 1924 AIR(Cal) 388.

3. In my opinion Section 92, Evidence Act, has no application. That section deals with matters which the law requires to be reduced to the form of a document and which are contracts, grants or other dispositions of property. This is indicated by the words ''as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest,'' which are only applicable in the case of a document of a dispositive character: see Law of Evidence by Woodroffe and Ameer Ali, 8th Edition, p. 6L1. The prohibition against the admission of oral evidence or statement contained in Section 92 applies only where the matter required by law to be in writing constitutes an instrument ejusdem generis with a contract, grant or other disposition of property; vide Ranglal v. Chunnilal,1920 16 NLR 204.

4. What is the character of an acknowledgment? Obviously it is neither contract, grant nor disposition of property, nor analogous to any of them. The acknowledgment need not be addressed to the creditor: Maniram v. Seth Rupchand,1906 33 ILR(Cal) 1047. It may be contained in a disposition: Periavenkan Udaya Tevar v. Subramaniam Chetti, 1897 20 ILR(Mad) 239. It may indeed be made in a formal way with a stamp affixed, but the formality is ncnanb for supplying evidence of debt: Stamp Act, Schedule 1 Article 1. It does not by itself operate by any means as a contract. I am aware that in Chunnilal v. Laxman Govind, 1922 AIR(Bom) 183, and Sitaram v. Nandram, 1925 AIR(Nag) 9, the acknowledgment was treated as an implied contract on the strength of certain observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council made in Maniram v. Seth Rupchand,1906 33 ILR(Cal) 1047, Although acknowledgment may imply promise for extending limitation, it is, without a promise, insufficient to create a contract and cannot be enforced as such: see Maganlal v. Amichand, 1928 AIR(Bom) 319, Sashikanta v.Sonaulla Munshi, 1929 AIR(Cal) 444 , and Raj Narain Rao v.Ram Sarup, 1930 AIR(All) 467 ; see also Govind Singh v. Bijoy Bahadur Singh, 1929 AIR(All) 980 . I am therefore of opinion that an acknowledgment is not a document contemplated in Section 92, Evidence Act.

5. The appellant further contends that the liability enforceable on the date of the acknowledgment arose from promissory notes which at any rate belong to the class of documents referred to in Section 92, Evidence Act, and that consequently no oral evidence was admissible to vary the terms thereof. I am aware of cases like Pentaya v. Kesheorao,1920 16 NLR 68, Vishnu Ramchandra Joshi v. Ganesh Krishna Sathe, 1921 AIR(Bom) 449, and Hira Lal v. Benarsi Das, 1925 AIR(Lah) 276. These eases are distinguishable as the suits were based on the promissory notes and the or






Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top