The central legal point established in the judgment is the application of Hindu Law to a Gond family's estate and the principles of impartibility, burden of proof, and succession under the Succession Act.

Hallifax, A J C—The suit out of which this appeal has arisen relates to the Zamindari of Sadak Arjuni in the Bhandara District and so much as we need to know of the genealogy of the Raj Gond family to one or more of whom it belongs is set out in the following table:

----------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | | Koba (Kodu) Muaja Manula Karansha Ghamesha Nawasha | | | | | ----------------- --------------- | Anantram | | | | Shukal (Kal) | Dasra Koksha Rupsha Faksha | | | ---------- Umrao | | | | ------------------------- Dewaji Jitu | | | | | | Sarjabai= Shankarsha Soma Doma | Lutu Ranalal Bapu | | | | (died en 18th Jhingria | Tilhu | November | | | 1917) | Basantalal | | | ------------------------ ---------------- | | | | | Daiiba Shrawan Sampat Gaju Biju | Yeshwantlal

2. The estate, which consists of ten villages and is of some antiquity, has been held and managed all along by the head of the family whether as sole owner or on behalf of other cosharers. Umrao Bapu died before his father and the successive holders of the estate alter Talwarsha were Koba, Mukasi, Anantrana and Ramlal Bapu. The members of the family who survived Ramlal Bapu on his death on 18th November 1917, were his widow Sarjabai and his father's second cousins, Shankarsha and Soma, sons of Rupsha, and Dowaji and Jhitu sons of Shukal with Yeswantlal grandson of Soma, Gaju and Biju sons of Dewaji, and Lutu son of Jhitu.

3. Now whatever the personal law governing the family may be, it is clear that we are concerned only with the two sons of Rupsha and the two sons of Shukal, even if it were a joint Hindu family, as it was held to be in the lower appellate Court, the shares of the others would be included in the shares of those four, who would also adequately represent them. Sarjabai claims to be the sole owner of the estate and her claim is supported by Shankarsha and Soma, who were the second branch of the family till Ramlal Bapu died and are now the senior branch. It is contested by Dewaji and Jhitu and their tons, who are now the junior of the two branches that aie left.

4. The records at present show Sarjabai as holding a two-thirds share in the zamindari and Shankarsha. Soma, Dewaji, and Jhitu as holding a one-twelfth or one anna four pie share each, though it is difficult to imagine how that came about. To establish their claim to a share Dewaji and Jhitu chose the indirect method of selling a 24th or eight pie share in each of eight of the 10 villages of Ganu Kohli and Atrnaram Kohli by a sale deed executed on 8th March 1918, for a consideration of Rs. 2,000.

5. The plaint in the suit was presented on 13th May 1919, by Sarjabai. She prayed for a declaration that, as the whole zamindari belonged to her and was impartible and inalienable, the sale deed of March 1918, was void, and for restoration of possession to her of the eight pie shares it purported to sell. Who is at present in possession of these shares is uncertain, but it appears that they have not yet been handed over to the purchasers. It has been held in the Courts below that the zemindari is an ordinary partible estate, held by a joint Hindu family consisting of the parties to this case other than the two Kohli defendants, and the suit and the appeal have been dismissed.

6. The last of the reliefs claimed in the plaint is an offer to repay the Rs. 2,000 paid by the purchasers to the other defendants if it be held that the sale cannot be set aside without it. This offer has been treated in both the Courts below as a claim to pre-emption, which was naturally rejected in the first Court, and in the lower appellate Court was withdrawn though it was never really there to withdraw. It was nothing more than an offer, the more creditable to the plaintiff from its uncommonness, to deal fairly and equitably with the purchasers in the event of the sale being set aside.

7. The first and most obvious mistake in the judgment of the learned District Judge lies in regardi