Under Hindu law, a woman's power of disposal over her property during coverture is subject to her husband's consent, and without such consent, the sale would not be valid.

Prideaux, A J C—Defendants 2 and 3 were the daughters of one Girmaji who died in 1908. The plaintiff's story is that he purchased the property in suit from defendants 2 and 3 who, inherited it from their deceased father. But defendant 1 obstructed the plaintiff in taking possession. Hence the present suit. Defendant 1 has purchased the property from defendants 2 and 3 on 7th June 1909, but the plaintiff contended that on that date they were minors so the sale is void. It was further pleaded that defendant 2 was not the guardian of defendant 3 in which capacity she is said to have executed the sale-deed in favour of defendant 1, and it was said that there was no legal necessity for the sale. The plaintiff's story was that defendant 2 was born on 13th June 1892 and defendant 3 on 4th November 1897. The fir3t two defendants contested the suit. Their story was that defendant 2 is the guardian of defendant 3 and was a major at the date of the sale to defendant 1, and that the sale was made to pay off the debts of the deceased Girmaji, and further that it was a prudent act and for the benefit of defendant 3. The sale to the plaintiff was impeached on the ground of undue influence and pressure; and defendant 3 was said to have ratified the sale to defendant 1 on 4th October 1920.

2. The trial Court found that defendant 2 was a minor on 7th June 1909 when she executed the sale in favour of defendant 1. Defendant 2 was found not to be the guardian of defendant 3 at that time, and the sale was found not binding on defendants 2 and 3. It was held that the sale to defendant 1 was for legal necessity and that defendant 3 did not ratify the sale, and further that the plaintiff's sale was not made under influence. The claim was decreed in full.

3. Defendant 1 appealed, and the lower appellate Court's finding may be summarized as follows : Defendant 2 was only 17 on 7th July 1909 and was a minor, and therefore the sale-deed of that date conveyed no title to defendant 1, and the ratification of that deed by defendant 3 could not make the transaction valid and binding even against her. There was no evidence to show that defendant 2 made any representation that she was a major, and even if she did, that would not estop the plaintiff. There was no necessity for the sale to defendant 1, it is not being proved that any debts due by Girmaji existed. Pressure or illegal influence was held not to be established in the plaintiff's sale. The Judge writes: The other ground on which the sale to plaintiff is impeached is that defendants 2 and 3 got the property from their father and these ladies could not alienate the property without the consent of their husbands. There is now no question of the consent of the husband of fendant 3 for that is not questioned here. There is no ''proof adduced ''by the plaintiff that defendant 2's husband had given his consent to the sale in favour of plaintiff. The husband Jairam (D.W. 7) denies this expressly. Plaintiff asserted as P.W. 1 that Jairam had taken part in bringing about the sale but there is no independent proof on the point. I must therefore find that defendant 2's husband did not consent to the sale in plaintiff's favour.

4. Holding that the wife was incompetent to sell the property without the consent of her husband, it was found that the plaintiff had no title to defendant 2's share, and the decree of the first Court was modified by decreeing joint possession to the extent of half. Against that decision the present appeal had been filed.

5. The appellant's arguments can be put under three heads. The first is that as Jairam, the husband of defendant 2 consented to the sale-deed dated 7th June 1909, it should be held that he consented to the sale of the property to the plaintiff. Secondly, that as the sale was not void but voidable, the husband alone was the person who could raise the plea and he was not a party to the case. It is thirdly argued that a broad view of the Hindu law on the subject should be