Courts will not interfere with interlocutory orders unless non-interference would cause irremedial injury or lead to a failure of justice. The court will consider the legal and equitable position of the parties in deciding whether to grant a temporary injunction.

Findlay, J C—The facts of this case which has led to the present revision application are so far correctly stated in the application. The order of the first Court refusing to grant a temporary injunction was a summary one, merely rejecting the connected application. The learned District Judge, in the appeal against this order and in the connected order in which he also refused the application for a temporary injunction, has dealt with the case in detail on the merits.

2. In this Court, it has, first of all, been urged on behalf of the non-applicants that no revision lies against an interlocutory order of the kind in question. In this connexion, the decisions in Amolaksao v. Govindrao,1919 15 NagLR 21 and Achalsingh v. Seth Jiwandas,1924 AIR(Nag) 44 as well as the majority decision in the Full Bench case of Buddhu Lal v. Mewa Ram, 1921 AIR(All) 1 have been relied on, on behalf of the non-applicants, while the applicant, in urging that revision lies, has quoted Abdullah Khan v. Banke Lal, 1911 33 ILR(All) 79 and Israil v. Shamser Rahman, 1914 41 ILR(Cal) 436 in favour of the opposite view, but, from the principles laid down in the latter Nagpur case quoted, it is perfectly obvious that there is no true analogy between an application for revision of an order rejecting an application to sue as a pauper and an order refusing a temporary injunction like the present one.

3. It is utterly impossible to postulate of the present case that the interlocutory order in question goes to the root of the case; it relates merely to an incidental matter connected with the trial of the connected suit, [t seems unnecessary, in the circumstances of the present case, to go into the vexed question of what is to be termed the decision of a case within Section 115, Civil P.C. That question is the subject of a great diversity of decisions, particularly as between the Allahabad and the Lahore High Courts and the remaining High Courts of India. Even, in the case of the latter High Courts, however, it has again and again been laid down that the High Court will not interfere in revision with interlocutory orders unless its non-interference will cause an irremedial injury or lead to a failure of justice. It is impossible to postulate any such premises of the present case. At the most, if the non-applicant 2 is allowed to remain in possession, the applicant may have to alter the nature of his relief and pay some additional Court-fees. Apart from this, however, even if I were of opinion that it was open to this Court to interfere in the case of an order like the present refusing a temporary injunction, I am satisfied on the merits that here there would be no cause for doing so. It is utterly impossible to postulate of the careful and reasoned order of the District Judge that either of the conditions A, B or C laid down in Section 115, Civil P.C., has been fulfilled. It would appear that the real object underlying the wish of the applicant to obtain a temporary injunction is to avoid having to sue for possession and having to pay Court-fees accordingly. As the case at present stands, the present applicant is, under the order passed under Order 21, Rule 98, Civil P.C., under an obligation to deliver possession and, until that order is upset in the civil Court, the equities seem to me to be largely in favour of the non-applicants being allowed to hold possession.

4. Considering the time of the day at which the sale-deed was taken, the explanation offered for the delay, viz., applicant's absence from Nagpur, does not; seem to me a satisfactory or an adequate one. The applicant's position is, in my opinion, both from the legal and equitable points of view, a peculiarly weak one in striving to obtain a temporary injunction. Eyen, therefore, if, on the merits, I had deemed it to be open to this Court to interfere, it would be quite impossible for me to hold that the learned District Judge has not exercised his discretion in a reasonable and equitable manner in r