1927 Supreme(Nagpur) 170
HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
Findlay
BHOLU – Appellant
Versus
PUNAJI – Respondent
Decided on : 22-08-1927
The distinction between Section 211 and Section 182, I.P.C., and the requirement of a complaint from the public servant for criminal proceedings under these sections.
Headnote:
Section 211 - False charge of offence made with intent to injure - Section 182 - False information, with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another - 211, 182
Fact of the Case:
Punaji filed a complaint against Bholu under Section 211, I.P.C., alleging that Bholu falsely reported to the police that Punaji and another man had committed arson. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate held that the complaint constituted an offence under Section 182, I.P.C., and required a complaint from the public servant. The Sessions Judge reversed this decision, directing further enquiry.
Finding of the Court:
The court analyzed the differences between Section 211 and Section 182, I.P.C., and concluded that no complaint from the public servant was necessary for a criminal complaint under Section 211, I.P.C., in the circumstances of the case.
Issues: Interpretation of Section 211 and Section 182, I.P.C., and the requirement of a complaint from the public servant for criminal proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that Section 211 and Section 182, I.P.C., cover different types of offences, and in the present case, no complaint from the public servant was necessary for a criminal complaint under Section 211, I.P.C.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the application, affirming the decision of the Sessions Judge.
Findlay, J C—The non-applicant in this Court, Punaji, filed a complaint in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Chhindwara, against the present applicant, Bholu, under Section 211, I.P.C. The complaint against Bholu was that he had specifically reported to the police that the present non-applicant Punaji and another man had committed arson in respect of burning of the house of one (sic) waji in the village concerned. The complainant, before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, alleged that the police, on enquiry, found no evidence against the present non-applicant and took no action on the ground that the report was a false and malicious one. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate held that, although the facts of the case might constitute an offence under Section 211, I.P.C., they nevertheless, equally constituted an offence under Section 182, I.P.C., and that, this being so, the complaint in writing of the public servant - in this case, the police officer who took report - was necessary under Section 195(1)(a), Criminal P.C., and that, as this was not forthcoming, he could not entertain the complaint.
2. The complainant Punaji applied in revision to the Sesssions Judge, Chhindwara, for the reversing of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order in question. His application succeeded and the learned Sessions Judge held that no sanction was necessary in the circumstances of the present case and directed the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to make further enquiry into the complaint. The applicant (accused) has now come up on revision to this Court against the said order of the learned Sessions Judge.
3. The main argument offered on behalf of the applicant is that, although Section 211, I.P.C., may be wider than Section 182 idem, yet every offence, which falls under Section 211 is nevertheless, an offence under Section 182, and that this being so the sanction of the public servant concerned was necessary to the institution of criminal proceedings as held by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. I am wholly unable, however, to agree that Sections 182 and 211, I.P.C., cover and refer to the same class of case. It is true that 111 (c) of Section 182, which was added by the Amending Act of 1895, does cover the case where a criminal offence is alleged to have been committed but there is this important difference that the person giving the information makes no implication whatever against any particular person. The other two illustrations (a) and (b) clearly do not necessarily relate to matter of criminal offences. The gist of Section 182 is that a person gives information which he knows or believes to be false intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, the public servant to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the truth were known to him, or to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person. Section 211 is, in my opinion, an offence of a different nature. There must be, from the first, a distinct intent to cause injury to a particular person and a distinct criminal offence must be alleged.
4. The decision in Emperor v. Hardwar Pal, 1912 34 ILR(All) 522 is, no doubt, in favour of the contention of the present applicant, but with all deference, I am unable to agree with the learned Judge who decided that case. I am humbly of opinion that the reasoning contained therein contains a fallacy, for it is assumed that, if, in the circumstances of a particular case, an offence under Section 211 is equally an offence under Section 182, I.P.C., previous sanction, or now a complaint, is necessary to the prosecution, even although no such sanction would be necessary under Section 195, Criminal P.C., if the offence were considered as solely falling under Section 211, I.P.C. The correctness of the decision in Emperor v. Hardwar Pal, 1912 34 ILR(All) 522 quoted above was doubted by Walsh, Ag. C J., and Ryves, J., in Emperor v. Kashi Ram, 1924 AIR(All) 779, but