The main legal point established in the judgment is that the nature of the property received by the daughter was determined by the application of personal laws, and the appellants could not establish continuous possession as legal heirs.

Macnair—The appellate Court considered that accepting the statements of the defendant it must be held that the defendant had not by himself and his predecessors-in title held the fields in suit continuously from a date previous to 1895. The defendant's story was that one Laxman was in possession of the fields, after his death his daughter Mathura obtained the property through a will executed by Laxman, and after the death of Mathura the defendants who are her sons were in possession, although they had a sister. The learned Additional District Judge held that according to this story the property became stridhan of Mathura and at her death was inherited by her daughter : the appellants not being the heirs of Mathura could not tack the period of Mathura's possession to their own.

2. In second appeal it was first urged that Section 47, Berar Alienated Villages Tenancy Law, did not require continuity through a pedigree of legal heirs of the original holders. But the appellants if not legal heirs of their mother must be considered to have come in possession as trespassers. It cannot be said that their mother was their predecessor-in-title. This ground therefore fails.

3. It is next urged that the question whether the plaintiff was the heir of their mother could not be decided on the materials on record. The defendants have pleaded that at the time of the will there was an agreement that on the demise of Mathura the fields should go to her male issue. The defendants father came to the Central Provinces and they may be governed by the personal law of these provinces. Again, there is no presumption that a devise to a daughter conveys more than the estate of a Hindu widow.

4. But evidence of statements made at the time of execution cannot be admitted for the purpose of varying the terms of the will. The testator was a native of Berar and was governed by the personal law of Berar : the personal law of the husband of the beneficiary can have nothing to do with the interpretation of the will : there is a presumption that in the absence of restricting phrases the estate conveyed to a daughter by a man governed by the Berar Personal Law is non-restricted estate and the property received is her stridhan.

5. I am next referred to Shriram v. Rajaram,1924 AIR(Nag) 83. but in Narain v. Tulsiram, 1925 AIR(Nag) 329, a Full Bench of this province dissented from that ruling : the Mitakshara is paramount and the Mayukha is of secondary consideration in Berar. The stridhan of Mathura, therefore, descended to her daughter, if Mathura's personal law was that prevalent in Berar it would of course do the same if she had on the marriage adopted the personal law of the Central Provinces. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed costs on the appellants.