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1927 Supreme(Nagpur) 201
HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
Findlay
GANPAT – Appellant
Versus
LAHANA – Respondent
Decided on : 29-09-1927
The central legal point established in the judgment is that a claim for money advanced in respect of a marriage contract may be considered a claim for damages in the event of a breach of the contract, rather than a mere refund of money advanced, influencing the court's decision on the triability of the suit.
Headnote:
Small Cause Courts Act - Marriage Contract - The court held that the suit for money advanced in respect of a marriage contract was not triable by the Small Cause Court as it was essentially a claim for damages in the event of a breach of the contract, rather than a mere refund of money advanced.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff filed a suit claiming Rs. 100 advanced for a marriage contract, along with Rs. 15 for expenses and Re. 1 as a pledge. The defendant argued that the suit was not triable by the Small Cause Court.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the suit was not triable by the Small Cause Court as it was essentially a claim for damages in the event of a breach of the marriage contract, rather than a mere refund of money advanced. The judgment and decree were reversed, and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed.
Issues: The main issue was whether the suit for money advanced in respect of a marriage contract was triable by the Small Cause Court.
Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted the nature of the claim, considering previous decisions and the underlying purpose of the payment, and concluded that it was essentially a claim for damages in the event of a breach of the marriage contract.
Final Decision: The court held that the suit was not triable by the Small Cause Court and reversed the judgment and decree, dismissing the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff was ordered to bear the defendant's costs in both Courts.
Findlay, J C—The first point raised in this application is that the present suit was not triable by the Court of Small Causes having regard to Article 35(g), Small Cause Courts Act. In the plaint it was alleged that Rs. 100 was advanced, so to speak, as consideration for marriage contract, as well as Rs. 15 for expenses and Re. 1 as a pledge. On behalf of the plaintiff it was further pled that the Rs. 100 were paid, as per custom, with the object of defraying generally the expenses of the pat marriage.
2. I have been referred by the pleader for the non-applicant to the decisions in Jagornath v. Radha Sunder,1909 13 CalWN 36 and Giris Chandra v. Purna Chandra to support the position that a claim like the present one for money advanced in respect of a marriage contract is recoverable in the Small Cause Courts. The ratio decidendi of these decisions seems to me to be that the suit is, in essence, one for a mere refund of money advanced, and not for compensation, having reference to Section 73, Contract Act. In Kali Bunker Dass v. Koylash Chunder Dass, 1888 15 ILR(Cal) 833, Pigot and Gordon, JJ., held that a suit to recover money spent in feeding relatives, in paying carriage hire and musicians in connexion with a marriage, which fell through, was not cognizable by a Small Cause Court. I concur in this opinion.
3. For my own part, and with all deference to the Judges who decided the Calcutta High Court cases quoted above, I am of opinion that, in essence, the present suit is, in reality, one for damages in respect of the breach of contract of marriage. It would be a reasonable construction to put on the contract in question that Rs. 100 was paid thereunder and that this sum, in reality, represented the amount of compensation which could be claimed if there was a breach of the contract. I do not think that, in the circumstances, the suit can properly be regarded as one for the mere recovery of a loan or refund of money advanced. The payment was inextricably connected with the marriage contract and it seems to me to follow that the suit for its recovery comes within the letter and the spirit of Article 35(g), Small Cause Courts Act. I am of opinion, therefore, that the suit was not cognizable in the Court of Small Causes.
4. It has, however, been urged on the strength of the decisions in Dholidas v. Fulchand,1898 22 ILR(Bom) 658, Venkata Kristnayya v. Lakshmi Narayana, 1908 32 ILR(Mad) 185 and Devarayan v. Mutturaman,1913 37 ILR(Mad) 393, that the suit did not lie as the payment was contrary to public policy and void under Section 23, Contract Act. These decisions so far support the proposition that a contract by which, their father or their guardian is paid money in consideration of his giving his son or daughter in marriage is against public policy and cannot be enforced in a Court of law. It was, however, pled in the present case on behalf of the applicant that there was a caste custom to make such a payment as we are concerned with, the underlying idea being that the money so paid would be used in meeting the expenses of marriage. I am not, however, prepared to accept the contention offered on behalf of the defendant-applicant in this connexion. It may be that the guardian or parent, to whom such a sum of money had been promised in consideration of his giving his son or daughter in marriage, might not be able to recover the sum so promised on the ground that the agreement is void as opposed to public policy. Here, the position is entirely different. The plaintiff accepted the money in advance, and a suit can in my opinion, lie to recover that money, there having been a breach of the marriage contract : Srinivasa v. Sesha,1918 41 ILR(Mad) 197 and Gulabchand v. Fulbai, 1909 33 ILR(Bom) 411. I am of opinion, therefore, that the suit in the present suit was not barred on the ground just considered.
5. A further question would, in any event, have arisen as to whether or not there was a caste custom to make such a payment in advan
