The provisions of Article 179 of the Limitation Act should be read subject to the provisions of Section 12(2), and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from shall be excluded in the computation of the prescribed period of limitation.

1. The amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit out of which this application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council arises is over ten thousand rupees and the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute in appeal to His Majesty in Council is also over ten thousand rupees. This Court did not affirm the decision of the Court of first instance. The case, therefore, fulfils the requirements of Section 110, Civil P.C.

2. But the non-applicant raises a question of limitation. Only two dates are material to understand the relevancy of this objection. The judgment of this Court was delivered on 16th December 1926. The present petition for leave to appeal was filed on 28th March 1927, i.e., on the 102nd day. As Article 179, Schedule 2, Lim. Act prescribes a period of 90 days for such a petition, it is contended that the petition is barred by time by 12 days. The applicants explain that the provisions of Article 179 must be read subject to the provisions-of Section 12(2), Lim. Act, which directs that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from shall be excluded. The applicants have filed a copy of the decree in support of this claim for exclusion of 12 days in the computation of the prescribed period of limitation. It is clear from the copy of the decree filed with the petition that 12 days were required for obtaining it. The sole question, therefore, is whether the provisions of Article 179 should be read as divorced from or controlled by the provisions of Section 12(2), Lim. Act. It is argued on behalf of the non-applicant that as the Civil Procedure Code does not lay down that a petition for leave to appeal to the Privy Council to be valid should be accompanied by a copy of the decree or judgment, as in the case of a memorandum of first or second appeal, the applicants are not entitled to any deduction on account of copying time.

3. We think that question of limitation must be decided with reference to the provisions of the Lim. Act alone and not of the Civil Procedure Code, as the validity of the petition for leave, for purposes of limitation, does not depend upon its validity for purposes of the Civil Procedure Code. It, therefore, follows that Article 179 cannot be read divorced from the imperative provisions Section 12(2), Lim. Act. In the majority of cases a petition for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council is made within 90 days and so no question of limitation ordinarily arises, but, if it is made after 90 days, the question of exclusion of copying time under Section 12(2), becomes material. Since the statute is clear, there is no need to look to the practice of the Court. But we are glad to state that the practice of our Court is in consonance with the statute. It is, to treat such petitions presented after 90 days as not barred by time, if in support of the claim for exclusion of copying time, the copy of the decree is filed by the applicant : of Syed Azizuddin v. Karamatullah Misc. Petn. 50-B of 1925, decided on 6th August 1926 and Jaiwanti Bai v. Nath, Misc. Petn. 11-B of 1927r decided on 10th August 1927. This view is in accord with that taken by the other High Courts in similar cases, Ram Sarup v. Jaswant Rai, 1916 38 ILR(All) 82, Eastern Mortgage and Agency Co. Ltd. v. Purna Chandra, 1912 39 ILR(Cal) 510, and Abdullah Hossein Chowdhury v. Ananda Chandra Roy, 1915 42 ILR(Cal) 35 in all of which the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree was excluded under Section 12(2). Mahabir Prasad Tewari v. Jamuna Singh, 1925 AIR(PC) 234 and In re Secretary of State,1925 AIR(Mad) 1241 were cases in which the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment also was excluded under Section 12(3), Lim. Act, and the one Wilayati Begam v. Jhandu Mal, 1926 AIR(All) 286 was a case in which a contrary view was taken by the Allahabad High Court. We need not consider the question of the exclusion of the time required for obtaining a copy of the judgment, as it does not dire