The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the applicability of Article 14 of the Limitation Act to a suit for a declaration of title and injunction, and the importance of the Plaintiffs' assertion of private ownership in determining the crucial question of title.

Kinkhede, A J C—The Plaintiffs-Respondents in this appeal own a factory abutting the Akola-Akot Road in Berar. All public roads, like all lands, which are not the property of individuals or of aggregates of persons legally capable of holding property and, except in so far as any rights of such persons may be established in or over the same and except as may be otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force, are and are declared under Section 38 of the Berar Land Revenue Code to be the property of the Government. The Plaintiffs' factory has been in existence since the year 1889 and the land on which it stands including a small strip of land which is in dispute in this suit is said to be in the peaceful possession of Plaintiffs and their predecessors in title for very many years. The Sub-Divisional Officer of Akot in an order dated 1-10-1920 held that a portion of the Akola-Akot road was encroached upon by the Plaintiffs and he consequently ordered demolition of such structure as stood upon the encroached strip of land. The order was appealed against to the Deputy Commissioner who dismissed the Plaintiffs' appeal on 17-6-1921. The Plaintiffs therefore instituted this suit against the Secretary of State for India in Council for a declaration of their title to the site in question and for an injunction restraining the Defendant and his officer from pulling down the structure and in the alternative for damages. This suit was filed on 17-7-1922 after service of a notice of suit under Section 80 of the Civil P. C.

2. The Defendant inter alia pleaded that the suit not having been instituted within one year from 1-10-1920, or at the latest from 17-6-21, was barred by limitation under Article 14 of the Limitation Act. This defence prevailed in the first Court, but was disallowed by the lower appellate Court. This appeal challenges the correctness of the order of the lower appellate Court.

3. Assuming that one year's period of limitation prescribed by Article 14 is applicable to a suit of this nature and that such limitation commenced to run in this case from the date of the Deputy Commissioner's order dated 17-6-1921, the suit is within time in view of the provisions of S. 15, Sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act which entitles the intending Plaintiff to exclude the period of notice i. e., two months in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the suit. The contention that the suit is barred by limitation even if it be counted from 17-6-1921 cannot therefore prevail.

4. It is next contended that if the starting point of limitation is the date of the order by the Sub-Divisional Officer the Plaintiffs' suit is hopelessly barred under Article 14. Article 14 prescribes one year's period of limitation for a

suit to set aside any act or order of an officer of Government in his, official capacity, not herein otherwise expressly provided for.

5. Inasmuch as the Limitation Act is an Act which takes away or restricts rights to start legal proceedings it must receive such a construction as the language in its plain meaning imports; Luchmee Buksh Roy v. Runjeet Ram Panday; it cannot be interpreted so as to restrict rights unless it is clear that the legislature intended that this should be done: Jogeshur Bhagat v. Ghanasham Dass,1900 5 CalWN 355. It cannot also be forgotten that the provisions of the Limitation Act must not be extended to cases which are not strictly within the enactment or do not come within the strict meaning of the words used. Of Parashram Jethmal v. Rakhma,1891 15 ILR(Bom) 299. The object of the Limitation Act is not to create or define causes of action but simply to prescribe the period within which existing rights can be enforced in the Courts of law: Surjyamoni Dasi v. Kali Kanta Das, 1901 28 ILR(Cal) 37 and Jivi v. Ramji,1878 3 ILR(Bom) 207.

6. It therefore follows that whether a particular suit is of the nature contemplated by a particular article must depand upon the form in which the suit is brough