The Provincial Legislature has the power to legislate retrospectively on a matter within its legislative competence, but that power is subject to any limitations imposed by the Constitution.

Sinha, C J—I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment about to be delivered by my learned Brother Mudholkar J. I agree with my learned Brother regarding the conclusions on the first and third contentions raised on behalf of the Appellant, that is to say, I agree with the Validating Act of 1941, if otherwise valid, is not Invalid as attempting to do something indirectly what it could not have done directly or that that Act ceased to have effect after the lapse of two years from the date of the proclamation issued under Section 93(1), Government of India Act.

But, with due respect, I do not agree with his conclusion as to the second point in so far as he has held that the Provincial Legislature was not competent to legislate, as it purported to do, by the Act of 1941, imposing a tax in excess of Rs. 50/- per annum per Individual, even relating to a period anterior to 31-3-1939.

2. When the Privy Council held that the Municipal Committee had failed to prove as to the rate of tax resolved upon by it at the special meeting, it did not hold that the imposition was invalid as 'ultra vires'. Its judgment had the effect of holding that the imposition was ineffective and therefore invalid because of the absence of any specified rate of tax. Such a lacuna could have been rectified by a fresh resolution of the Municipal Committee or at any rate by fresh legislation and it would have related back to the time of the original imposition.

The case of Attorney General v. Pougett, 1816 2 Price 381(A) is an authority for the proposition that an Act of Parliament made to correct an error of omission in a former statute has a relation back to the time when the first Act was passed. In the course of the judgment Thomson, C.B., observed as follows: The duty in this instance was, in fact, imposed by the first Act; but the gross mistake of the omission of the weight, for which the sum expressed was to have been payable, occasioned the amendment made by the subsequent Act; but that had reference to the former Statute as soon as it passed, and they must be taken together as if they were one and the same Act; and the first must be read, as containing in itself, in words, the amendment supplied by the last.

3. The Validating Act of 1938 would thus have supplied the lacuna but for the circumstance, as pointed out by this Court in Firm Radhakisan Jaikisan v. Municipal Committee,1940 NLJ 638(B), that the assent of the Governor-General had not been obtained. The Act was therefore, declared to be ineffective on account of the repugnancy there pointed out.

4. The Validating Act of 1941 was thus enacted to cure that illegality. The effect of that Act would naturally be to render valid what had been declared to be Invalid by this Court. There can be no question but that such legislation is intended to have retrospective operation.

The Act in terms validated the imposition of the tax from 1922 to 1938. The only question that can properly arise for decision, and which has been pressed upon us, is that the Act of 1941 is 'ultra vires' because, it is argued, the Provincial Legislature was not competent to legislate on the subject without the limitation laid down in Section 142-A(2) after the amendment of the Government of India Act of 1935 by Insertion of Section 142-A.

5. The Provincial Legislature has been empowered by entry No. 46 of List II of the sevevnth Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935, to levy: Taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments, subject, however, to the "provisions of Section one hundred and forty-two-A of this Act.

The tax validated by the Act of 1941 is in terms completely covered by this entry. But this power has been curtailed by the enactment of Section 142A, which is as follows:

(1) Notwithstanding anything in Section one hundred of this Act, no Provincial law relating to taxes for the benefit of a Province or of a municipality, district board, local board or other local authority therein in respect of professions