A family arrangement must be supported by consideration and cannot be merely a cloak for the transfer of property. Mere expectancy or hope of acquisition of property cannot be regarded as a consideration at law. The English doctrine of expectancy, which allows for the creation of actual interests in property based on mere expectancy or hope of acquisition, is not applicable in India due to the prohibition against dealings with mere expectancy under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act.

1. This is a Defendant's appeal from a decree confirming the possession of the Plaintiff over a 3 anna share in mauza Chingrod and certain sir and khudkasht lands situate therein.

2. It is common ground that Guhan, the deceased husband of the Defendant-Appellant, and Punau, the Plaintiff-Respondent, were brothers, born of different mothers, and held jointly an 3 anna share in mauza Chingrod with sir and klusdkasht lands in that share. In addition, they also joint owners of 50 acres of occupancy land in mauza Lafin Khurd.

Before Guhan's death, the land and certain house property at Lafin was partitioned by metes and bounds and was in the separate possession of Guhan and Punau. After his death, the village share owned by the two brothers in mauza Chingrod was actually partitioned and mutated separately in the names of the Appellant and Punau. That was on 24-1-1945.

3. According to the Respondent, on 4-5-1945, a document style 1 as family arrangement was signed by the Appellant, the Respondent, the Appellant's daughter Pilibai and her husband Rambhamosa as guardian of their minor son Gendram and by Maktula, the mother of Punau.

Under this document, 1-anna share together with proportionate sir and khudkasht land out of the 4-anna share which was in mauza, Chingrod in the possession of the Appellant in pursuance of the partition dated 24-1-1945 was purported to be given absolutely by her to Pilibai, while 25 acres of land and the house property at Lafin which had been already partitioned during the lifetime of Guhan was retained by her absolutely. The interest conveyed to Pilibai in the village share was also said to he absolute.

The partition deed further purported to provide that the remaining property i.e. the Appellant's 3-anna share in mauza Chingrod together with proportionate sir and khudkasht land was to pass absolutely and immediately to the Respondent. When the document was sought to be registered, the Appellant, objected to the registration on the ground that she was not a party to the document that her mukhtyar had used certain blank papers bearing her thumb impressions which were in his possession and that therefore she was not bound by that document. Overruling her objection the document was registered.

4. According to the Respondent, he entered into the possession of the property purported to have been allotted to him under the document, and that Pilibai also likewise entered into possession of the property allotted to her thereunder. He then stated that even though they had entered into possession of this property the Appellant, through her servants and with the help of her son-in-law began to remove the crops from the fields and thus threatened to disturb his possession.

He therefore commenced proceedings under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. He added that in those proceedings the crops were attached under the orders of the Court and were eventually delivered to the Appellant. The Respondent's contention is that the document of 4-5-1945 is a family arrangement between him and the Appellant and is consequently binding upon her.

5. The Appellant's defence is that her husband Guhun, separated from the Respondent in the year 1942 and that thereupon the village share with, sir and khudkasht lands thereto and the land and house property at Lafin was completely partitioned during his lifetime. She further stated that the land at Lafin was separately recorded in the names of the two brothers and that her husband had actually applied for the mutation of his 4-anna share in mauza Chingrod but that due to the fact that he was ill he could not remain present in the Revenue Court on the date which was fixed for hearing and consequently it was dismissed.

She however asserted that despite this fact he was actually in separate possession of his share. She added that after the death of her husband she applied for the mutation of her share separately in her name but the revenue authorities recorded the entire 8-anna share jo