An order in revision is not a "judgment decree or filial order" and therefore not appealable to the Supreme Court under Art. 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution.

1. This is an application for a certificate under Art. 133 (1) (a) or in the alternative under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution.

2. The trial Court decided the following two preliminary issues against the applicant:

(1) Whether the plaintiff had sent a valid notice to defendant No. 1 in accordance with S. 80, Civil P.C., before the institution of the suit?

(2) Whether the plaintiff's suit is not maintainable on account of the non-registration of the plaintiff firm before the transaction in suit?

The application for revision of these findings was dismissed on the ground that the decision was correct on merits. This Court in effect held that the lower Court did not exercise jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. The contention of the contesting non-applicant that the application for revision of the interlocutory order was not maintainable was not therefore decided.

3. According in the learned Counsel for the applicant, this order in Civil Revision No. 858 of 1951 is "a judgment or final order" within the meaning of Art. 133 (1), cls. (a) and (c), and a substantial question of law of general importance about the requirements of a valid notice under S. 80, Civil P.C., is involved in this case.

The learned Counsel for the contesting non-applicant No. 1 submits that the order is neither a judgment nor a final order, that an appeal does not lie to the Supreme Court from an order of this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, and that the case does not satisfy the requirements of cl. (c) of Art. 133 (1).

4. Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution is wider in scope than S. 109 (a), Civil P.C. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in - ' Joy Chand v. Kamalaksha, 1949 AIR(PC) 239' at p. 241 (A). The view that orders passed In revision do not fad within S. 109 (a) has been accrued by High Courts in India then the High Court at Calcutta, and their Lordship think It is connect.

Under S. 109 (a) the right of appeal is restricted to a judgment decree on (sic) order passed on appeal. The words passed on appeal" are omitted from Art. 133. appeal (sic) this Article from an order passed by (sic) High Court in the exercise of its re visional judication is therefore competent.

5. The principal question for consideration is whether the order in question is a "judgement decree or filial order". There is no doubt that it is not a decree. Relying on the fell wing passage in - "Messrs. Shriram Gulabdas v. board of Revenue,1954 AIR(Nag) 1'. at p. 11 (D)), the learned Counsel for the applicant submitted, that it was a judgment : The term 'judgment' is in my view used in Article 132 (1) in the wider sense to include any decision given by the High Court on a question or questions at issue between the parties to am proceeding properly before the Court which finally determines the rights of parties so far as the Court is concerned.

Deo, J.

The word "judgment" in Art. 132 is apparently used in a wider sense than in Art. 133. In the former Article it is applicable to civil, criminal or other proceedings. That in Article 133 is limited to judgment in civil proceedings. Under S. 115, Civil P.C. the High Court does not deliver a "judgment" but "may make such order in the case as it thinks fit".

The order under this section, refusing to interfere with the finding of the subordinate Court that the notice of suit under S. 80 of the Code was valid cannot be regarded as a final order though on a contrary finding the plaint might have been rejected against defendant No. 1 under O. VII, R. 11 (- ' Kanailal v. Governor-General . for India in Council, 1948 AIR(Pat) 164' (C)), or its name might have been struck off from the array of defendants if the suit could proceed without defendant No. 1 ( - ' Kanganna v. Ramlingam, 1948 AIR(Pat) 117'(D). There is no decision of the rights of the parties on merits, Even on an adverse finding plaintiff is not precluded from bringing a fresh suit the same cause of action after gi