The value of the subject-matter of the suit for purposes of Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the actual market value on the date of the suit, and any subsequent increase or decrease is irrelevant.

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against our decision in Second. Appeal No. 720 of 1945.

2. The appeal arose out of a suit for preemption of one field of the area of 17 acres 16 gunthas. The Applicant pleaded that the value of the field was Rs. 8,500, while the non-Applicant asserted that the value was no more than Rs. 3,000. Both the Courts found the value at Rs. 3,306. That value was not disturbed by this Court. On those findings the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance was toe-low Rs. 10,000.

3. The learned Counsel for the Applicant, however, contends that the price paid for the field was as for agricultural land and that the value of the land has since increased and is further likely to increase because of the permission obtained to divert the land to non-agricultural uses. The Applicant's allegation was that on 22-1-1944, i.e. after the institution of the suit he had paid Rs. 9,222 for converting the land to non-agricultural uses (vide Exhibit l-D-8). We dealt with this point in paragraph 23 of our decision. Any increase in the value of the subject-matter of the suit subsequent to its institution cannot be taken into account in determining the value at the date of the suit. See- Rajendra Kumar v. Rash Behari, 1931 AIR(PC) 125 (A) and- Govindbhai Lallubhai v. Dahyabhai Nathabhai, 1937 AIR(Bom) 326. We must therefore hold that the case does not satisfy the first requirement of the first paragraph of Section 110, Code of Civil Procedure.

4. The learned Counsel for the Applicant, however, contends that he is entitled to appeal because of the second paragraph of the section. It is well settled that each of the two requirements laid down in the first paragraph of the section, viz. that the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance and the value of the subject-matter in dispute on appeal must be Rs. 10,000 or upwards, has to be fulfilled separately. See-Moti Chand v. Ganga Pershad Singh - Bhawarlal v. Lachmandas, 1929 AIR(Nag) 75;- Mangamma v. Mahalakshmamma, 1930 AIR(PC) 44 and- : AIR 1931 P.C. 125 (A),. Further, it is also clear that the second paragraph in the section is not an alternative to the 'whole' of the first paragraph but only to the second requirement in that paragraph. See- Champamani Bibi v. Mohammad Yunus, 1951 AIR(Pat) 177, and-Maung Thwe v. A.L.A.R. Chetty Firm,1923 AIR(Raj) 71. As in the instant case, the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of the first instance was below Rs. 10,000 it is futile for the Applicant to invoke the second paragraph of the section.

5. Our decision only affirmed the decree of the Court below. That being so, the Applicant has to further satisfy that the case involves a substantial question of law. The substantial question of law, according to the Applicant, is whether there is a right of preemption in respect of a sale in the absence of the execution of a registered document as required by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. So far as cases governed by the Mahomedan Law of preemption are concerned, it is not disputed that the question is concluded by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in- Sitaram Bhaurao v. Jiaul Hasan Khan, 1923 AIR(PC) 41. In-Jainarayan Ramgopal v. Balwant Maroti,1939 AIR(Nag) 35, Bose J. (as he then was) was of the view that the decision of the Privy Council also concludes the question under the general law of preemption in India. Two Division Benches of this Court before the decision, under consideration also took the same view.

6. It may, however, be pointed out that the decision of the appeal is not concluded by an answer to the question as posed by the Applicant. The failure of the Applicant was due to three facts: that the vendor received the full consideration as agreed, that the vendee obtained possession of the property and that the registered document was not executed only with a view to defeating the right of preem