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1952 Supreme(Nagpur) 144
HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
Hidayatullah, Sen
SHRIRAM MAROTI AND ORS – Appellant
Versus
NARAYAN JAIRAM AND ANR – Respondent
Civil Revision No. 615 of 1952
Decided on : 22-12-1952
G R Mudholkar, M N Phadke, Advocates
The civil court has jurisdiction to grant an injunction to a protected lessee to protect his rights, even though the power to reinstate a dispossessed lessee is given to the Revenue Officer.
Headnote:
BERAR REGULATION OF AGRICULTURAL LEASES ACT, 1951 - JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS - SECTIONS 16, 19, 23 - CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT - INJUNCTION TO PROTECT RIGHTS OF PROTECTED LESSEE - POWER OF CIVIL COURT - SUMMARY OF ACT AND SECTIONS REFERENCED AND DISCUSSED BY THE COURT.
Fact of the Case:
The non-applicant filed a suit seeking a perpetual injunction restraining the applicants from disturbing his possession of the fields in suit till the end of the year 1955-56. The non-applicant claimed that he had taken an oral lease from Defendant 3 Kisanlal the suit fields for the year 1951-52 and executed a 'kabuliyat' in his favor on 12-4-1951. He claimed that under Section 3 of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 (24 of 1951), he became a protected lessee for a period of five years commencing from the agricultural year 1951-52 and that the action of Defendant 3 in attempting to dispossess him was illegal. The applicants denied the lease and claimed that they had purchased the fields in suit from Kisanlal by a registered deed of sale dated 7th January 1952 and had taken actual possession in the first week of February 1952.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the civil court had jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction to the non-applicant as the Revenue Officer did not have the power to grant a prohibitory injunction against the lessor. The court also held that the power to grant an injunction was not taken away by implication simply because the power to reinstate had been given to the Revenue Court.
Issues: 1. Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to grant an injunction to the non-applicant. 2. Whether the power to grant an injunction was taken away by implication simply because the power to reinstate had been given to the Revenue Court.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 16 of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 (24 of 1951) impinges upon the powers and jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to a limited extent. It provides that the Civil Courts shall not entertain any suit instituted, or an application made, to obtain a decision or order of any matter which a Revenue Officer is by or under the Act empowered to determine, decide or dispose of. 2. Section 23 of the Act preserves the ordinary rights and privileges of the lessee under any law for the time being in force. 3. The right of a protected lessee to protect his rights through the Civil Court by obtaining an injunction, whether temporary or perpetual, has in no way been taken away, and such relief can only be granted by the Civil Court. 4. The Revenue Officer can only order reinstatement of a protected lessee who has been wrongfully evicted.
Final Decision: The application for revision was dismissed with costs.
1. This civil revision arises out of a civil suit in which a temporary injunction was granted by the trial Court and an appeal against that order has been rejected by the Additional District Judge, Akola. The applicants before us are Defendants in the suit.
2. The suit was brought by the non-applicant (Plaintiff) asking the Court for a perpetual injunction restraining the applicants from disturbing the non-applicant's possession of the fields in suit till the end of the year 1955-56.
3. The non-applicant's allegations were that he had taken on an oral lease from Defendant 3 Kisanlal the suit fields for the year 1951-52. According to the non-applicant, a 'kabuliyat' was also executed by him on 12-4-1951 in favour of Kisanlal. The non-applicant claimed that under Section 3 of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 (24 of 1951) he became a protected lessee for a period of five years commencing from the agricultural year 1951-52 and that the action of Defendant 3 in attempting to dispossess him was illegal. The non-applicant further averred that Defendant 3 Kisanlal had transferred to Defendants 1 and 2 (applicants Shriram and Laxman sons of Maroti Aware, minors) the proprietorship of these fields and these applicants were attempting to dispossess him through their servants.
4. The applicants (as Defendants) denied that the Plaintiff (non-applicant) had taken an oral lease of the fields in suit as alleged by him or that he had executed a 'kabuliyat' on 12-4-1951. They also denied that any lease money was paid to Kisanlal as was alleged by the Plaintiff. They contested the allegation of the Plaintiff that he was a protected lessee under the said Act and stated that the right could not be claimed against the minor Defendants because of the provisions of the Act itself. They admitted, however, that they had purchased the fields in suit for Rs. 21,162/8/-from Kisanlal by a registered deed of sale dated the 7th January 1952. They contended that they had taken actual possession of the fields in the first week of February 1952 and, therefore, the Court could not grant an injunction because it would be ineffective and too late. The suit was filed on 15th April 1952. It may also be mentioned here that Act XXIV of 1951 came into force on 15th November 1951.
5. The trial Court held on affidavits that the possession of the fields was with the non-applicant; that the jurisdiction of the civil court was not barred by any of the provisions of the said Act and that, therefore, a temporary injunction could be granted in the case. Against that decision an appeal was taken to the Additional District Judge, but without success. The present revision application has accordingly been filed.
6. The first argument of the learned Counsel for the applicants is that the civil court has no jurisdiction whatever in the matter because, according to him, the Act purports to create a new right and provides for a self-contained and exclusive remedy arising from that right whenever it is infringed. He relies upon the dictum of Sir Lawrence Jenkins in, - Bhaishankar v. Municipal Corporation of Bombay, 1907 31 ILR(Bom) 604; 609 (A) where it is stated by the learned Chief Justice that where special rights out of the ordinary course are created and a new machinery is set up to remedy the infringement of those rights, there is no ouster of ordinary Courts because they never had any; there is no change of the old order of things; a new order is brought into being. Reference was also made by him to - The Municipal Committee, Akot v. The Surajmal Shriram Ginning & Pressing Factory, Akola, 1938 AIR(Nag) 119; 121 (B) where the dictum of Sir Lawrence Jenkins was relied on in this Court by Niyogi J. and also to - Barraclough v. Brown, 1897 AC 615.
The contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants is that the ordinary rights under the Transfer of Property Act and other existing laws are taken away by the new legislation and new rights have been created a
