The Insolvency Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine all matters related to the insolvency petition, including the existence of the debt, and cannot refer the parties to a regular suit.

1. This is a miscellaneous appeal against the decision of the District Judge, East Berar, Amravati, on 24-6-1950 dismissing the appeal against the order of the Insolvency Judge, Amravati, dated 23-11-1949.

2. The Appellant as creditor filed an application in the Insolvency Court for the adjudication of the Respondent as an insolvent. He claimed to be a creditor because of three promissory notes of Rs. 300/-, Rs. 600/- and Rs. 2,500/- admittedly executed by the Respondent Ramji on 18-1-1949, 1-4-1949 and 1-6-1949 respectively. In reply, Ramji pleaded that these promissory notes were executed as security against loss in connection with a dramatic party and its performances. He denied that there was any consideration and that the Respondent had already asked for accounts and return of the promissory notes when the application was filed in the Insolvency Court merely to evade the court-fee stamp required for bringing the suit on the said promissory notes.

3. When this statement was filed, the Insolvency Court came to the conclusion that since complicated pleas of fact and law were involved the matter should be tried on the regular side and referred the applicant-creditor to a regular suit. In doing so he followed - Gopikabai v. Chapsi Lohana, 1935 AIR(Bom) 80 (A). The Court further directed that the suit be filed within 2 1/2 months. The petition for adjudicating Ramji as an insolvent' was kept pending in the meantime.

4. Against this order an appeal was filed, but without success, and hence this second appeal. A preliminary objection was taken to the tenability of the appeal under Section 75, Provincial Insolvency Act. It is obvious that the appellate order is not the kind of order against which a second appeal lies see - Sadhu Ram v. Kishori Lal, 1938 AIR(Lah) 490 (B), - Budhsen v. Asharfi Lal, 1938 AIR(All) 28 (C) and - AIR 1935 Bom 80 (A). Indeed, the Appellant had also a similar apprehension inasmuch as he paid additional court-fee required for revision and also put in a note that in case an appeal did not lie the memorandum of appeal should be treated as a Civil Revision. As a revision it is barred by two days, but we condone the delay.

5. The question next is whether the action of the Insolvency Court was correct. There is a conflict of opinion on this point. One view is represented by - Gopikabai v. Chapsi Lohana (A) cited above. The other view is adverted to in the order of the District Judge but is not acceptable to him. We have to decide which view is the correct one.

6. Gopikabai v. Chapsi Lohana (A) '' was a decision of a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. In that case it was held that there is nothing in the Provincial Insolvency Act which compels the Insolvency Court to decide every question arising in the proceeding before that Court, whether under Section 24 read with Section 9 or otherwise, and that the Insolvency Court can, if it considers that complicated . questions of fact or law are likely to arise, refer the parties to a regular suit. The learned Single Judge noticed the decisions in - Hukam Chand v. Ganga Ram,1927 AIR(Lah) 111 (D); - Nur Mahommad v. Lalchand, 1925 AIR(Lah) 436 (E) and - Chetty Firm v. Maung Aung Bwint,1923 AIR(Rang) 21 (F) and observed: I agree with the principle of these decisions to this extent that ordinarily where a creditor presents an application, and the debtor challenges the creditor's right to apply, the Insolvency Court will ask for proof from the creditor as to his right and is entitled to go into that question. But, to my mind, it does not follow therefrom that the Insolvency Court must decide every question connected with it or which may incidentally arise from it, and cannot refer the parties to a regular suit in any case if it is of opinion that a complicated question of fact or law arises therein.

From this observation it is clear that unless the Insolvency Court can be held to be expressly barred from referring the parties to a civil Court, the exercise of th