Deo—This order will govern Civil Revision No. 580 of 1952 also.

2. Plaintiff-applicant had instituted this suit against the non-applicants for possession of absolute occupancy fields on the ground that they were trespassers and had no right to remain in possession without his permission.

3. The trial Court held that in consequence of the Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, the plaintiff-lambardar was not entitled to continue his suit and dismissed it. The plaintiff appealed.

4. In the lower appellate Court it was noticed that the plaintiff had paid court-fee as if it were a suit between landlord and tenant to which S. 7, cl. (xi)(cc), Court-fees Act, was applicable. The plaintiff was, therefore, directed to value the subject-matter and pay the required court-fee on the memorandum of appeal and also on the plaint. Civil Revision No. 581 of 1952 challenges this order.

5. At the adjourned hearing the appellant remained absent and the memo of appeal was therefore rejected under O. XLI, R. 3, Civil P.C., as it was insufficiently stamped. Civil Revision No. 580 of 1952 is against this order.

6. Section 12(ii), Court-fees Act runs thus: Whenever any such suit comes before a Court of appeal, reference or revision, if such Court considers that the said question has been wrongly decided, to the detriment of the revenue, it shall require the party by whom such fee has been paid to pay so much additional fee as would have been payable had the question been, rightly decided, and the provisions of S. 10, para, (ii), shall apply.

That paragraph runs thus: In such case the suit shall be stayed until the additional fee is paid. If the additional fee is not paid within such time as the Court shall fix, the suit shall be dismissed.

7. I therefore called upon the plaintiff-applicant to satisfy me whether the court-fee paid on the plaint and the memorandum of appeal in the lower appellate Court was correct. If he has not paid proper court-fee, this Court can call upon him to make up the deficit before his case can be heard. I have therefore to determine whether the court-fee on the plaint and the memorandum of appeal in the lower appellate Court was proper.

Section 7, Cl. (xi) (cc) refers to a suit between landlord and tenant for the recovery of immovable property from a tenant including a tenant holding over after the determination of the tenancy. As already stated, the defendants were not tenants of the plaintiff but had according to plaintiff's allegations, taken forcible possession from the absolute occupancy tenants. Such persons cannot be tenants of the plaintiff and the plaintiff had expressly stated in the plaint that he does not recognize them as his tenants.

8. The learned counsel contends that such persons are tenants-at-will. As I understand, the term 'tenancy-at-will arises by implication of law in cases of permissible occupation when a person is in possession of the premises with the consent of the owner or it may arise expressly by an agreement to lease for an indefinite term for a compensation accruing from day to day so long as both parties please. The defendants can-not therefore be tenants-at-will.

The learned counsel relied on - Ghulam Dastagir Saheb v. Marudai Pillai, 1948 AIR(Mad) 409; - Abdul Rahman v. Budhu, 1951 AIR(Pat) 403. But none of these decisions are of any assistance. AIR 1949 Mad 409 (A) was a suit by a lessee against the lessor and a previous lessee in possession whose term had expired. Since the suit against the lessor was governed by S. 7(xi)(cc) the former lessee could be included in the term 'landlord' because he could not raise any defence which was not available to his lessor as against the plaintiff was a suit by a tenant for possession against a purchaser of landlord's interest. The purchaser was obviously a landlord within the meaning of S. 7(xi)(c) which was applicable to that case. There is no case reported at p. 404 of AIR 1951 Mad. but there is one cage at p. 206 (In re Annadhana Katlai (C) ). It was