The meaning of 'any' in the definition of 'motor spirit' in the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, is 'no matter what' and not 'each and every'.

1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

2. The Petitioner is a dealer in petrol and lubricants at Raipur. In April 1948 he started selling 'High Speed Diesel Oil'. Between April 1948 and the 20th October 1949, the Petitioner paid sales tax thereon amounting to Rs. 1841-13-0 at the rate of -1-/6 per rupee. In October 1949, he was informed by Messrs. Burma Shell Co., Calcutta, through whom he receives supplies of Diesel Oil, that he was liable to pay thereon 12 1/2 p.c. tax under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938. He, therefore, started crediting the tax at the aforesaid rate in the Government Treasury at Raipur.

3. On 5th March 1952 the Petitioner received a notice from the District Excise Officer, Raipur, demanding payment from him of the sum of Rs. 7597/8/- on account of the tax leviable in respect of the sales made by the Petitioner during the years 1948, 1949 and 1950. According to the Petitioner he is not liable to pay the amount and that the provisions of the Act of 1938 do not apply to the sale of Diesel oil.

4. On behalf of the Petitioner the liability of the Petitioner was challenged on three grounds. They are:

(i) that 'Diesel Oil' is not 'motor spirit' as defined in Section 2(c), Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938;

(ii) that the aforesaid Act must be deemed to have been repealed by the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947; and

(iii) that the Petitioner having already paid the sales tax on the sales made by him during the period mentioned in the notice, the demand of the tax under the Act of 1938 was not legal.

5. During the course of the arguments the learned Advocate-General stated on behalf of the State Government that the Government would give the Petitioner due credit for the sales tax already received by them and that the amount specified in the demand made by the District Excise Officer would be 'pro tanto' reduced. In view of this statement the learned Counsel for the Petitioner staled, that he did not wish to press the third point. We would therefore confine our decision to the first and second points.

6. The definition of 'motor spirit' in Section 2(c) of the Act of 1938 is as follows: "motor spirit" means any inflammable hydrocarbon (including any mixture of hydrocarbons or any liquid containing hydrocarbon) which is ordinarily used for providing reasonably efficient motive power for any form of motor vehicle.

According to the learned Counsel a fuel oil cannot be regarded as motor spirit unless it is shown that it is 'ordinarily' used for providing motive power for each and every kind of motor vehicle. He conceded that diesel oil is ordinarily used for running certain special types of vehicles including motor buses and trucks but he said that was not sufficient to bring the oil within the definition of 'motor spirit'. He would have us give the adjective 'any' the meaning "each and every". Admitting that the word 'any' is capable of being used to mean 'no matter what' he says that where, as here, there is an ambiguity the interpretation must be made in a manner beneficial to the Petitioner as the law in question is a fiscal statute. In support of his contention that 'any' is given the meaning 'each and every' in the construction of a provision of a fiscal statute he refers to the decision in the - Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Arunachalam Chettiar 47 Mad 660.

7. There the learned Judges were dealing with a reference under Section 66(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. In this connection they had to consider the meaning of the word 'any' occurring in Section 10 meant 'each' as contended for on behalf of the State, or 'each and every' as contended for on behalf of the Assessee. The learned Judges looking at the Act as a whole, construed the word to mean 'each and every' as in their opinion such a construction was more rational. He then referred to Craies on Statute Law, pages