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1952 Supreme(Nagpur) 93

HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
Hidayatullah, V R Sen
PANNALAL AND ORS – Appellant
Versus
SITABAI – Respondent
First Appeal No. 72 of 1945
Decided on : 14-08-1952

Advocates Appeared:
P R Padhye, Y V Jakatdar, Advocates

The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 applies to Jains as well as Hindus proper, and the term 'Hindu' as used in the Act embraces Jains.

Headnote:

Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 - Applicability - Jains - Whether governed by the Act - Migration from Baroda State - Effect - Customary law - Applicability.

Fact of the Case:

The suit was filed by the widow of Maganchand Jain for partition of the joint family property, claiming as a widow entitled to a half share in the property under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. The main contention of the Defendants was that Sitabai was not entitled to avail herself of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, inasmuch as the parties to the suit are Jains and the Act does not apply to them. They also contended that the family migrated from Gujerat and is subject to the laws existing at the time of their migration, in Gujerat and is thus not subject to the laws passed in British India.

Finding of the Court:

1. The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 applies to Jains as well as Hindus proper. 2. The term 'Hindu' as used in the Act embraces Jains. 3. The family migrated from Baroda State to British India and is subject to the laws of British India, including the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. 4. The custom of absolute interest taken by the Jain widow by special custom when there is no son is not applicable in the present case as the Act gives a better right to the widow.

Issues: 1. Whether the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 applies to Jains? 2. Whether the family migrated from Baroda State to British India and is subject to the laws of British India, including the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937? 3. Whether the custom of absolute interest taken by the Jain widow by special custom when there is no son is applicable in the present case?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The term 'Hindu' as used in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 includes Jains, as Jains are considered to be Hindu dissenters. 2. The family migrated from Baroda State to British India and is subject to the laws of British India, including the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, as the family was domiciled in British India and were British Indian subjects. 3. The custom of absolute interest taken by the Jain widow by special custom when there is no son is not applicable in the present case as the Act gives a better right to the widow.

Final Decision: The appeal and the cross-objection were dismissed with costs.

JUDGMENT

1. This appeal is by the Defendants in a suit for partition brought by one Sitabai alias Chanchalbai widow of one Maganchand Jain who died in the year 1941. Along with the appeal there is also a cross-objection filed by the Respondent.

2. The genealogy of the family is as follows:

Amarchand (Dead) | -------------------------------------------------- | | | Batanchand Maganchand Chhaganlal (Died 1926) (Died on 7-10-1941) (Died about 1914, = Sitabai alias Chan- | chalbai(Plff.) | | ---------------------------------------------- | | | Pannalal (Deft. 1) Motilal (Deft. 2) Champalal (Deft. 8.)

Admittedly, Maganchand belonged to a joint family consisting of himself and his three nephews, who are the Appellants. Maganchand died on the 7th October 1941 and this suit was brought by his widow Sitabai on the 29th April 1942 for a partition of the joint family property, claiming as a widow entitled to a half share in the property under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. Along with the plaint, Sitabai filed schedules of the property belonging to the family. These schedules were partly admitted by the Defendants in the suit, but their main contention was that Sitabai was not entitled to avail herself of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, inasmuch as the parties to the suit are Jains and the Act does not apply to them. They also contended that the family migrated from Gujerat and is subject to the laws existing at the time of their migration, in Gujerat and is thus not subject to the laws passed in British India. On the question of the schedules, the Defendants joined issue with the Plaintiff wherever there was a difference between them.

3. The learned Judge of the Court below decreed the Plaintiff's suit, holding that the Act in question was applicable to Jains and also passed a preliminary decree for partition in respect of the items of property which he held bad been proved as existing on the date of the disruption of the family.

4. The appeal has been filed by the Defendants, who urge again that the Act is not applicable to the parties on the general ground that the Jains are not Hindus and also on the special ground that as the family had migrated from Patan in Baroda State, they must be presumed to have brought their own law from that place and were immune from the amendments of the general Hindu law made in British India. The appeal is thus restricted to these two points. It may be pointed out that the Plaintiff had urged that there was a partition during the life-time of Maganchand and that she was entitled to certain properties as the absolute owner of these properties representing her deceased husband. This plea was abandoned in this Court after it was negatived by the Court below, and. we need say no more about it. It may also be pointed out that the cross-objection concerns only a few of the items which the lower Court has found against the Plaintiff. Many grounds were urged in the memorandum of cross-objection, but they were abandoned before us. All grounds from 1 to 3 inclusive were expressly abandoned. The cross-objection of the Plaintiff was confined to the items in the plaint Schedule C, marked f(i) and (ii) and (g) and item No. B(4) of Schedule D. We shall deal with the cross-objection after the appeal.

5. In this appeal the first contention of the Appellants is that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act does not apply to them as the family is a 'Jain family' and not a 'Hindu family'. It is contended that Jains are not Hindus and the Act makes special reference to Hindus.

6. It is too late in the day to contend that 'Jains' are not included in the term "Hindus" for purposes of law. A reference to any standard text-book on Hindu Law will give a list of the leading cases on the subject. We need not refer to all the authorities here because the essence of those authorities is to be found stated in the commentaries on Hindu Law by eminent writers. In Mayne's Hindu Law (11th Edition) at page 82, the disti























































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