The insolvency Court has the jurisdiction to confirm, reverse, or modify any act or decision of a receiver, and an appeal lies to the District Court in such cases.

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the to the Supreme Court against the Order dated 19-1-1951 passed in Civil Revision No. 323 of 1950, setting aside the order of insolvency Court dated 30-1-1950 accepting the bid of the present Applicant Radhakisan Laxminarayan and directing that a sale deed be executed in his favour.

2. The offer made by the Applicant at the auction held by the receiver was taken subject to acceptance by the insolvency Court. There is therefore no substance in the contention that the receiver had agreed to sell the property to the Applicant and that the Court had no jurisdiction to revoke that agreement. The insolvency Court has ample jurisdiction under Section 68 of the Act and under its inherent powers of confirm, reverse or modify any act or decision of a receiver. Under Section 75 of the Act a debtor, any other person aggrieved by a decision come to or an order made in the exercise of insolvency jurisdiction by a Court subordinate to a District Court, may appeal to the District Court was according to law, to call for such case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit.

Even if the order dated 30-1-1950 is regarded as an order confirming the act of the receiver, an appeal lay to the District Court. This Court held that the insolvency Court acted under a misapprehension that the receiver had entered into a completed agreement of sale and that there was no valid objection to that act. The learned District Judge took the view that the receiver had absolute power of sale and the insolvency Court had no control over him. This decision is clearly unsupportable on fact and based on a misconception of the powers of the insolvency Court. The order of and facts, this Court had jurisdiction to pass an appropriate order. The order dated 30-1-1950 was set aside and this Court got the sale held by the receiver under its immediate supervision, with the result that as against the bid of Rs. 13,500/- made by the present Applicant the property fetched Rs. 40,00-0-0.

3. The person at whose instance this Court interfered in revisional jurisdiction is non-Applicant 2. He has remained 'ex parte.' On behalf of the receiver non-Applicant 1 it is contended that this application is not tenable as the order of this Court is not a final order within the meaning of Section 109, Code of Civil Procedure and that the proposed appeal does not raise any substantial question of law. It is further contended that no appeal lies to the Supreme Court against an order passed in revisional jurisdiction.

4. The learned Counsel for the applicant does not rely on Section 109(c), Code of Civil Procedure For the reasons already stated, we are of the opinion that that proposed appeal does not raise any substantial question of law. As rightly submitted by the learned Counsel, it is not necessary that the appeal must involve some substantial question of law as the order of this Court does not affirm the decision of the Court immediately below.

5. Under Section 109, Code of Civil Procedure an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from any decree or final order passed on appeal by a High Court or by any other Court of final appellate jurisdiction. The question for decision therefore is whether the order dated 19-1-1951 is an order passed on appeal. It has been held that an appeal to the Privy Council under Section 109 against a revisional order of a High Court is incompetent as it is not an order "on appeal." - Suraj Singh v. Phul Kumari, 1926 AIR(All) 202 Atma Raw v. Beni Prasad,1934 AIR(All) 198 Krishna Chandra v. Rajendra Narayan, 1936 AIR(Pat) 465 Adaikappa Chettiar v. Ramaraja Thevar, 1943 AIR(Mad) 614, & - Rukmangal Prasad v. Mt. Durga,1946 AIR(Oudh) 101. We therefore hold that no appeal lies against the order in question. The application for leave is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 50/-.

Final Result : Dismissed