Sinha And Mudholkar, J—This appeal and Letters Patent Appeal 15 of 1947 are in the nature of cross-appeals from the same order, which in effect is an order of remand. When the appeals were filed the office expressed a doubt as to the maintainability of the appeals in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in KUNWARLAL SINGH v. SMT. UMADEVI, 1946 ILR(Nag) 482. Though the point arising in these appeals was not specifically decided in that case, the 'ratio decidendi' in that case would seem to cover the present case also. As we entertain a doubt, as regards the correctness of that decision applied to the present appeals we refer the following question for the decision of a Full Bench:

Whether the order of remand passed by a Single Judge of this Court sitting in Second Appeal amounts to a judgment within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court?

These appeals will be heard after the Full Bench has decided the point.

OPINION

2. SINHA C. J.: I have had the advantage of perusing the opinion recorded by my learned Brother Hidyatullah J. In his exhaustive treatment of the subject, viz., the legal significance of the term 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent he has dealt with the main currents of decisions of the different High Courts in India as also of the Federal Court and of their Lordships of the Privy Council. He has not confined his attention only to the question referred but has dealt with the subject on a much wider scale. He has taken the trouble of propounding a definition of the term 'judgment'. Speaking for myself I would not attempt a definition which the Legislature has not attempted so far, beyond saying that 'judgment' means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. That is a definition given by the Code of Civil Procedure, which may not be conterminous with the meaning attached to the term 'judgment' under the Letters Patent. I agree with my learned Brother in the answer proposed by him to the question referred to the Full Bench.

3. As indicated in the opinion of my learned Brother Hidayatullah J. this reference was necessitated by the observations made in a number of reported decisions of this Court which relying upon the ruling of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in, JERANCHOD BHOGILAL v. DAKORE TEMPLE COMMITTEE, 1925 AIR(PC) 155, appear to hold that the term 'judgment' in clause 10 of the Letters Patent means a decree in a civil case and that therefore no appeal under that clause of the Letters Patent would lie from a judgment which had not the effect of a decree. The learned Judge has referred in detail to those decisions of this Court in paragraphs 76 to 83 of his opinion. Hence I need not repeat those references. I would agree with him in holding that in so far as those cases held that the decision of their Lordships of the P. C. referred to above is an authority for the proposition that no appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent would lie from a judgment which has not the effect of a decree, they are not on solid ground, and those observations, apart from the actual decisions, must therefore be held to be not good law.

But I do not thereby mean to say that the actual decisions in those cases were wrong. As a matter of fact, in most of those cases the actual decisions could be supported without, going so far as to say that the Privy Council in the case referred to above intended to lay down that sweeping proposition. As we have pointed out in our judgment in 'DR. GOVIND WAMAN PANDIT v. PURUSHOTTAM VITHAL', L. P. A. No. 5 of 1950, D/- 26-12-1951 (Nag) discussed in detail in paragraphs 84 to 87 of the opinion of my learned Brother, the misunderstanding of the Privy Council judgment aforesaid arose from the circumstance that the unofficial report of the case has not given the facts of the case or the arguments at the Bar before their Lordships.

As the words used by their Lordships have not