The Rent Control Order governs the landlord-tenant relationship for a limited purpose and does not determine the measure of damages for being kept out of the property. There must be a difference between rent and the amount justly awarded as damages to a successful litigant.

Sinha, C J—This is a Defendant's second appeal from the concurrent decisions of the Courts below granting the successful Plaintiff mesne profits at a figure much higher than the amount of rent which was payable by the Defendant during his period of tenancy.

2. It appears that the house, in respect of which mesne profits have been ordered by the final decree at the preliminary stage passed by this Court, was in the occupation of the Defendant at the monthly rent of Rs. 24/-. After obtaining permission from the Bent Controller the Plaintiff instituted a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent until a certain period and for mesne profits or the subsequent period at the rate of Rs. 40 per month. After the suit had been decreed by the Courts below the Appellant came up to this Court in second appeal and, as is usual obtained an order of stay from this Court oh terms. The term was that the Defendant would continue to deposit a sum of Rs. 24 per month at regular intervals. Those sums were as directed by this Court deposited and subsequently withdrawn by the decree-holder-Plaintiff. The stay matter came before this Court on two occasions, and on each occasion a single Judge directed that Rs. 24 per month, the monthly rent fetched by the house, should be' deposited by the judgment-debtor as a condition precedent for the grant of a stay order. The second appeal to this Court was ultimately dismissed.

3. Thereafter proceedings for ascertaining mesne profits began and t the contention raised in the Courts below and repeated in this Court was that the successful Plaintiff was not entitled to any sum in excess of Rs. 24 per month. The argument is put in this way. It is suggested that as the Rent Control Order was in force the landlord could not claim any enhancement of rent, and therefore the Plaintiff, even though, successful in her action in ejectment, should not be held entitled to the sum of Rs. 40 per month as decreed by the Courts below.

4. It is also contended that as observed by this Court in - Hasanali v. Darashap, 1949 AIR(Nag) 282 at p. 284 (A) 'the rent is a fair measure of compensation'. In my opinion, there is no substance in either of these contentions. The Rent Control Order governs, for the limited purpose of that Order relationship of landlord and tenant. It has absolutely no relevance to the question, of what should be the measure of damages which a successful Plaintiff should get for being kept out of his or her property. After, the determination of the tenancy the position of the Appellant was that of a trespasser, and a trespasser cannot invoke in aid the provisions of that Order. This Court has not laid it down that in every case rent would be a fair measure of compensation. In some cases it may be, in other cases it may not be. As observed by Denning J. in - Clifton Securities Ltd. v. Huntley,1948 2 AllER 283 (B): When the rent represents the fair value of the premises, mesne profits are assessed at the amount of the rent, but, if the real value is higher than the rent, then the mesne profits must be assessed at the higher value.

This case was brought to my notice by the learned Counsel for the Appellant himself and has laid down a manifestly sound principle of law that there must be a difference between rent and the amount which may justly be awarded by way of damages to a successful litigant who has been kept out of his property. The Defendant was naturally anxious to continue in possession of the premises even after the suit for possession had been decreed by the Courts below and succeeded in obtaining a stay order from this Court on the terms aforesaid. He cannot now take advantage of the interim order of stay passed by this Court and contend on the basis thereof that rent must be the fair basis for awarding damages to the Plaintiff. During the pendency of the second appeal in this Court the Defendant was allowed to remain in possession on the same terms on which he held the property during the period of his t