The main legal point established in the judgment is that the amendment to the rules of the Court is a procedural matter and does not affect the appellant's substantive rights. The Court determines that the appellant had a right to appeal to the High Court, but had no vested right to have the appeal heard by a particular Judge or by any specified number of Judges.

Bose, C J—Counsel for the Appellant challenges the jurisdiction of a single Judge to hear this appeal. The appeal is over Rs. 2,000 in value. According to the affidavit the subject-matter of the appeal is now worth over a lakh of rupees. If a single Judge hears it no appeal will lie to the Federal Court because of Section 111, Code of Civil Procedure but if a Division Bench hears it an appeal will lie as of right. Up till 27th May 1949 this appeal would have been heard by a Division Bench but because of the alteration in the Rules of this Court effected on 27 th May 1949 all second appeals have now to be heard by a single Judge. This is a second appeal, but it was filed on 13th October 1945. Counsel for the Appellant contends that a right of appeal is a vested right and relies on Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving 1905 A.C. 369 : 74 L.J.P.C. 77; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi, 1927 AIR(PC) 242; Bhagwat Rao v. Damodhar, 1938 ILR(Nag) 91 and Sadar Ali v. Dolimuddin, 1928 AIR(Cal) 640. Re-lying on the same rulings he contends, (1) that this vested right to have his case heard by a Division Bench with a right of appeal over to the Federal Court cannot be taken away by the rule-making powers of the High Court and (2) that in any event as the Rule is not expressly made retrospective it cannot affect pending appeals. Therefore a single Judge has no jurisdiction.

2. The decision of Rankin C.J., in Sadar Ali v. Doliluddin, 1928 AIR(Cal) 640 , is very much in point and as it has been approved by the Division Bench in Bhagwat Rao v. Damodhar, 1938 ILR(Nag) 91 I do not consider it proper, sitting as a single Judge, to differ from it. But the point is of great importance and will affect a very large number of second appeals, so I think it right that it should be heard at an early date by a Full Bench of three Judges.

3. As at present advised I am inclined to doubt the soundness of Rankin C.J.'s decision. The Division Bench of this Court which approves of it does not touch the particular point now before me, so the matter is an open one so far as I am concerned, but in view of the approval accorded to Rankin C.J., I do not feel free to differ without a reference to a Full Bench.

4. As at present advised I consider that the only vested right is the right of appeal. That is conferred by Clause 11, Letters Patent, read with Sections 96 and 100, Code of Civil Procedure Those rights have not been touched by the amended rule. The Appellant had a right to appeal to this Court and that has not been affected, but in my judgment he had no vested right to have his appeal heard either by a particular Judge or by any specified number of Judges, How the appeal once lodged is to be dealt with is, in my opinion, a question of procedure.

5. Clause 26, Letters Patent, deals with the powers of the Judges to deal with appeals before the High Court as opposed to the jurisdiction of the Court conferred by Clause 11. The powers are subject to the Rules made under Section 108, Government of India Act, 1915. The present section in the Government of India Act, 1935, namely, Section 223, merely carries us back to Section 108 in the old Act, so that is all we have to consider. That gives the High Court the right to frame rules governing the powers of single Judges and Division Benches to exercise, among other things, the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. In my opinion that does not touch the jurisdiction of the High Court and is a procedural matter. The right of appeal to the Federal Court under Clause 29 only arises if and when two Judges decide an appeal and not before.

6. Rankin C.J. goes so far as to say that the right of a litigant arises when he institutes his suit. If that is correct the present alteration in our rules will not have effect for many years to come and in each case we will have to look to the date of the institution of the suit to determine whether the appeal can be heard by one Judge or two.

7. I