A married woman may have absolute power of disposal over her inherited property without the consent of her husband, and the limitation period for a suit may be calculated based on relevant provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Debt Conciliation Act, 1933, and Central Provinces and Berar Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1939.

Bose, J—This case is, in my opinion, a very simple one. The two defendants Kasabai and Badhabai executed a mortgage in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff now sues upon his mortgage. Kasabai admitted the claim. Radhabai resisted on two grounds: one, that the mortgage was without consideration and two, that she bad no power to mortgage because the property was inherited from her mother and so she could not mortgage without her husband's consent which consent was not obtained.

2. The first Court found that there was consideration and that finding of fact was not questioned either in the lower appellate Court or before as. That is therefore now final.

3. The other question involves a difficult question of Hindu law which, in my opinion, need not be decided and I prefer not to express any opinion on it one way or the other. In a mortgage suit the question of title is. in the absence of fraud etc. irrelevant as between the parties to the mortgage The mortgagee takes whatever title his mortgagor has and is entitled to enforce his mortgage against his mortgagor. It does not matter whether both sides knew that the mortgagor's title is imperfect because if the mortgagee is content to take that, he is entitled to it. The mortgagor engages to give the mortgagee such title as he or she has and cannot in a mortgage suit be heard to say that he or she did not give such an undertaking. It is irrelevant whether in fact he or she has the title he or she purports to convey. The plaintiff is, therefore, in my opinion, entitled to the decree he seeks against Hadhabai as well as against Kasabai who admitted the claim.

4. I would allow the appeal and decree the claim against Radhabai as well on that short ground As regards costs, I would allow the plaintiff his costs in the first Court but not in the lower appellate Court or here because in neither Court did he take this simple point. It was raised by us here and we heard the learned Counsel for. Radhabai on it. All he contended was that there was no estoppel because both sides knew the facts and the law. But there is, in my opinion a fallacy in this contention because the agreement is to give and take such title as Radhabai has. Accordingly, here and in the lower appellate Court I. would direct each party to bear its own costs.

Sen, J.

5. This appeal arises out of a suit on a mortgage. The appellant sued to enforce the mortgage, dated 3rd June I925 executed by respondents l and 2, Kasabai and Radhabai, for Rs. 2,875. The amount was payable with interest on 21st June 1926. The suit was filed on 18th June 1941 more than 12 years after the date fixed for payment. The claim was within limitation because in calculating the period of limitation for the suit the plaintiff was entitled under Section 28, Central Provinces and Berar Debt Conciliation Act. 1933, and Section 24, Central Provinces and Berar Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1939 to exclude the period between 20th April 1937 and 15th October 1940 when the proceedings were pendings before the Debt Conciliation Board Chikhli, and subsequently before the Debt Relief Court, Chikhli for the settlement of the debt.

6. Repondent 1 Kasabai admitted the claim in full. Respondent 2 Radhabai contested the claim and pleaded that the property under mortgage was inherited by her from her mother and that as a married woman she had no power to mortgage the property without the consent of her husband and the mortgage in suit was void because it was executed by her without the consent of her husband.

7. The trial Court held that the property under mortgage was inherited by Badhabai from her mother and was Asaudayika stridhana property and that she had no power of disposal without the consent of her husband and that the mortgage was void so far as she was concerned. The trial Court accordingly by the decree dated 30th June 1942 dismissed the claim as against Radhabai and her share of the property but de-creed the claim in full as against the share of Kasabai. The d