The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of the rights and safeguards provided to government servants under the Constitution Act, particularly in relation to dismissal and entitlement to arrears of pay.

Bose, J—This is an appeal by the Provincial Government in a case in which a Sub-Inspector of Police has sued for arrears of pay from 8th October 1937 to 10th November 1943, the date of the suit.

2. The plaintiff was appointed a Sub-Inspector of Police by the Inspector General of Police of the Central Provinces in 1917 after a period of preliminary training. He was confirmed in 2918.

3. On 27th October 1937 the District Superintendent of Police placed him under suspension, and after a departmental enquiry he was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police on 10th November 1937.

4. The plaintiff's case is that as he was appointed by the Inspector-General he could not be dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General; and that is now conceded by the Grown because of the recent decision of the Federal Court reported in Punjab Province v. Tara Chand,1947 AIR(FC) 23. The matter is also dealt with in earlier decisions of that Court : Secretary of State for India v. I.M. Lall, 1945 AIR(FC) 47 and Suraj Narain v. N.W.F. Province, 1942 AIR(PC) 3. It is also referred to by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India, 1937 AIR(PC) 27. These decisions are all based on Section 240(2), Constitution Act.

5. In this case the plaintiff appealed to the Inspector-General from his dismissal. The appeal was rejected and a petition to the ''Provincial Government also failed. Because of the Federal Court's ruling in Suraj Narain v. N.W.F. Province, 1942 AIR(PC) 3, no attempt was made to argue that the action of the Inspector-General in dismissing the appeal was equivalent to an order of dismissal by him. It must, therefore, be accepted as Bottled that the dismissal here was, to use the language of the Privy Council in Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India, 1937 AIR(PC) 27, which the Federal. Court reproduce, ''bad and inoperative.''

6. In the latest Federal Court case Punjab Province v. Tara Ghand,1947 AIR(FC) 23, the plaintiff was given three years arrears of pay, their Lordships holding that Article 102, Limitation Act, applied. The learned Government Pleader conceded that that would be proper in an ordinary case, but here he contended a factor arises which abrogates that rule. The plaintiff was placed under suspension on 27th September 1937. If the order of dismissal is ''bad and inoperative'', or just ''a piece of waste paper'' as the Federal Court ob serve, then that incident is blotted out and we are left with the position of the plaintiff as it existed on that date. He was then under suspension. That order has never been legally revoked nor is there anything by virtue of which he car be deemed to have been reinstated. Therefore he must be treated as still under suspension.

7. It was nest contended that when a Government servant is placed under suspension he is completely at the mercy of Government, and though Government can, if it so pleases, grant him a compassionate allowance up to one-quarter of his pay, it is not bound to do so and the plaintiff has no right to claim anything. It was made clear that in this case Government intended to give the plaintiff one-fourth of his pay for three years as a matter of grace after the case was over, but we were asked to decide the issue as it raises an important question of law.

8. Pushed to its logical consequences this would mean that the statutory safeguard provided by Parliament could be evaded. Instead of dismissing outright all Government need do is to suspend indefinitely and then refuse to pay subsistence allowance on the ground that that is a pure matter of grace. We cannot accept such an interpretation of the Act.

9. The learned Government Pleader argued that if that was our view then an anomaly would result. He said it is impossible to turn a void and inoperative order of dismissal into one of reinstatement. But, it is, we think, equally impossible to say that such an order can be taken to involve a revival of the period of suspension which