The main legal principle established is that the doctrine of frustration, as per the Indian Contract Act, Section 56, applies when a contract becomes impossible to perform, and the interruption caused by external events must render the contract impossible as a whole.

Bose—The plaintiff is the Governor-General in Council. The defendant is the Treasurer of the Nagpur City Post Office. The suit is for damages for the loss and/or destruction of articles entrusted to the defendant's agents for or on behalf of the plaintiff. There is not much dispute about the facts, except on one or two points, and the main question we have to consider is how far the doctrine of frustration relieves the defendant from liability.

2. The defendant was appointed Treasurer of the Nagpur City Post Office on the 18th June 1942 under an agreement (Exhibit P-21) of that date. The document sets out the conditions of appointment and contains the extent and limits of the defendant's liabilities. It will be necessary to construe it with some elaboration. But for the moment all we need say is that under it the defendant was to appoint his own men for carrying on the work for which he was appointed. He was to be responsible for their actions, and he undertook to indemnify the plaintiff to the extent and under the conditions set out in the agreement for all loss or damage to such properties as might from time to time be entrusted to his care in the ordinary course of postal business. That roughly sets out the broad position so far as is necessary for this case.

3. It is not disputed that articles valued at Rs. 11,227-7-10 were entrusted to the defendant's care. They consisted of cash, stamps, insured articles and quinine. It is also accepted, except in one respect, that the defendant took due and proper care of the articles: that they were kept by him in the cages and safes and boxes appointed by the rules for the purpose, and that, except in one respect, the loss which occurred was beyond his power and control. The lower Court finds that the defendant was not negligent. That is disputed on one point which we will have to examine, but generally, it can be accepted that the defendant acted with due care and attention and that he took every precaution which the stringent rules of his office demand. It is admitted that the loss and destruction of the property was directly attributable to the serious disturbances which occurred in August 1942 all over the country. A riotious mob broke into the post office, broke open the building, rifled its contents, looted some of the property and ultimately set fire to the place. The forces of law and order were overpowered, and for a time there was chaos in that section of the City.

4. Now, the plaintiff, the Governor-General in Council, was then responsible for the maintenance of law and order. Acting under powers conferred by the Constitution Act, the plaintiff took over the responsibility for law and order from the Provincial Governments. The defendant's case is that having done so the plaintiff was bound to afford him protection from lawlessness of this kind. He claims that he also had a right to it under his contract because that formed the very foundation and basis of the agreement between them. Therefore, the plaintiff having failed in the duty which it owed him, and that being the understanding on which they contracted, he, the defendant, can hardly be called upon to fulfill his terms of the bargain when the plaintiff failed in his duty.

5. Put in another way the defendant's case is this. He says that under the terms of the contract he was bound to perform his duties in a building of the plaintiff's choice. He was bound to keep the articles entrusted to his care in cages and boxes and safes provided by the plaintiff. He had no option in the matter. These were the conditions of his employment. But it was all on the understanding that the plaintiff would afford him proper protection. The defendant was quite prepared to cope with ordinary law breaking, such as burglary, robbery, theft and so forth, but he can hardly be expected to cope with lawlessness on a scale which rendered even the powerful forces at the plaintiff's command temporarily impotent. Whether the occurrences of that t