The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Section 14 and Section 4 of the Limitation Act in relation to the exclusion of time taken in a previous court and the presentation of the plaint in the proper court.

1. This is an appeal by defendant 2 and the only point foe consideration is whether the suit itself was time-barred. The cause of lotion on a promissory note arose on 6-11-1936, and on 3-11-1939 the plaintiffs brought, a suit in the Court of the First Sub-Judge Second Class, Jubbulpore.

2. On 8-5-1940, that Court held that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit as no part of the cause of action arose at Jubbulpore and returned the plaint to be filed in the proper Court, which in this case was the Court of the First Sub. Judge, Second Class, Chhindwara. The 4th of May was a working day, the 5th of May was a Sunday, and the Courts closed for the summer vacation on the next day, the 6th of May. The plaint was presented on the day on which the Courts re-opened.

3. In the Chhindwara Court, the defendants took the stand in their written statement without elaborating their reasons, that the suit was time-barred. That the argument turned on the right to exclude the time taken in the Court of Jubbulpore is evident from the finding of the trial Court that the suit at Jubbulpore was prosecuted bona fide and that the time there, taken could be excluded under the provisions of Section 14, Limitation Act. The Court also found that the delay in not filing a suit on the 4th of May in Chhindwara was excusable in view of the distance of Chhindwara from Jubbulpore and the fact that preparation would have to be made before the plaint could be presented in Chhindwara.

4. On appeal by the defendants, the lower appellate Court on a full consideration of the litigation held that there had been no want of diligence in prosecuting the case in the Jubbulpore Court which ultimately found that it had no jurisdiction, and that the suit was instituted there bona fide, and the Court' pointed out conflicting rulings in the Judicial Commissioner's Court which misled the plaintiffs' counsel. The learned appellate Judge, however, did not agree that the delay after the 4th of May could be condoned. He held that it was prefectly possible for the plaintiff to reach Chhindwara on the 4th of May.

5. He found, however, that his decision was immaterial inasmuch as he had allowed the time taken in the Jubbulpore Court to be excluded, that limitation expired on a day when the Court was closed, and that the plaint was presented in the proper Court on the first day that the Courts re-opened.

6. In appeal, it was contended that Section 4, Limitation Act cannot be tacked on to the time excluded under Section 14, and the case in Wamanrao Anandrao v. Umrao Tulshiramji, 1937 AIR(Nag) 215 was cited in support of the contention. This case, however, has no application since it was decided on the point that then limitation had expired during the vacation the plaint was not presented in the appropriate Court on the day on which the Courts reopened but on the second day. That Section 4, which by itself excludes no time, can be tacked on to Section 14, Limitation Act is apparent from the decision of their Lord-ships of the Privy Council in Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh, 1935 AIR(PC) 85. It is there stated that what Section 4 of the Act pro-vides is that where the period of limitation prescribed expires on a day when the Court is closed the application may be made on the day when the Court re-opens and that 'the Court' means the proper Court in which the application ought to have been made.

7. To the same effect is a judgment by a Divisional Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bejoy Kumar v. Kusum Kumari, 1929 AIR(Cal) 315. In the case we are now considering, the plaint was laid in the proper Court and was presented on the first day after the Courts reopened, they having been closed on the date when limitation expired. It is also clear that limitation had not expired until the 5th of May and there was no need for the trial Court to condone the delay in not presenting the plaint on the 4th May. Deducting the time taken in the Jubbulpore Court the plaintiff had 2 days in ha