The judgment establishes the principle that the limitation period and the requirement for the deposit to be made on the same day as the application are essential conditions precedent in applications for setting aside court sales.

Hidayatullah, J—This is a revision against the order of Mr. G.V. Ayachit, Additional District Judge, Seoni in Misc. Appeal No. 5 of 1944, dated 27th January 1945.

2. The applicant, Umed Singh, is a private purchaser of property which was the subject of a Court sale in execution of a decree in civil Suit No. 45-B of 1939, and was purchased by Shankerlal Kalar. The decree-holder in the suit was Bhairo Sao and the judgment-debtor Birat Singh. The court sale took place on 23rd August 1944. On 25th September 1944 two applications were put in to set aside the sale. One was by Birat Singh and the other by the present applicant. The trial Court by its order D/- 2nd October 1944 dismissed Birat Singh's application as the necessary deposit was not made on 22nd September 1944 and the application was beyond the period of 30 days.

With regard to Umed Singh's application the learned Court took a different view and ordered him to make the necessary deposit till 3rd October 1944 and on 20th October 1944 the Court set aside the sale. The learned Judge said: The explanation offered by the counsel on behalf of Umed Singh is that he could not present such an application within one month and specially on the last day as this Court was away on casual leave.

The application being late by three days the learned Judge condoned the delay and extended the time for the making of the application and the deposit.

3. The learned Additional District Judge reversed this decision. It is difficult to see how the learned trial Judge could distinguish the case of the two applicants before him as he did.

4. In the case of Umed Singh also the limitation of 30 days applied and the making of a deposit is a condition precedent to the application. Llearned Counsel in support of his application relies on Md. Akbar Zaman Khan v. Sukhdeo Pande,1911 13 CrLJ 467, Dulhin Mathura Koer v. Bansidhar Singh,12 15 CrLJ 83, Nur Muhammad v. Ghulaman, 1934 AIR(Lah) 622 and Raomal v. Amarsingh, 1926 AIR(Nag) 331 and argues that when the Court was on casual leave on 22nd September 1944 the Court must be deemed to be closed on that date. He claims, therefore, to deduct one day from the days spent till 22nd September 1944 and as 23rd September 1944 was a Saturday he claims to be in time on 25th September 1944.

5. It has been held in Maqbul Ahmad v. Pratap Narain Singh that Sections 4 and 14, Limitation Act, are not similar in their effect. Whereas under Section 14 of the Act the time spent can be excluded, Section 4 does not entitle a person to add the days on which the Court is closed to the statutory period. He must do the act on the very next day on which the Court is open. Applying these rulings in the light of the Privy Council lease just referred to here, it was imperative for Umed Singh to file his application and make the necessary deposit en 23rd September 1944 when presumably he Court was present. The applicant has been unable to show why he should be excused for not filing his application on 23rd September 1944 and for not making the deposit also on the same date.

6. The application which was ultimately filed was prepared oh 25th. September 1944 and the stamps for it were also bought on the 25th idem. It is obvious that the applicant took no action till that date and is now using the Court's absence to get a longer period of limitation.

7. Further even on 25th September 1944 he did not make the deposit and as held in Vannisami Thevar v. Periayaswami Thevar, 1917 AIR(Mad) 176, Amritlal Narsilal v. Sadashiv, 1944 AIR(Bom) 233, Arumughathammal v. Mangoomal Lunida Singh Firm, 1944 AIR(Mad) 565 and Narayan v. Ramkrishnaji, 1925 AIR(Nag) 30 the making of a deposit is a condition precedent to the making of an application under' Order 21, Rule 89, Civil P.C. This was not done on the same day on which the 'application was matte.

10. The order of the learned Additional District. Judge, Seoni, is upheld. The application for revision is dismissed with costs Counsel's tea Rs. 20.