HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
RAMRAO SHAMRAO AND AND ORS – Appellant
Versus
DATTADAYAL BISHANDAYAL AND ORS – Respondent
Decided on : 22-10-1946
mortgage - appeal by defendants - mortgage dated 11-1-1921 - res judicata - compromise decree - effect of consent decree - liability of minor - challenge of compromise decree by minor - effect of decree on family members - challenge of mortgage on grounds of legal necessity and immorality - coercion plea - decree for sale vs foreclosure
Fact of the Case:
Defendants 5 to 9 appealed in a suit on a mortgage dated 11-1-1921 for Rs. 30,000. Shankar, a minor at the date of the mortgage, was represented by his eldest brother Shamrao. The mortgage was assigned to the plaintiffs on 24-4-1934.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the compromise decree was binding, and the mortgagee was entitled to enforce the mortgage against the whole family. The court also rejected challenges to the mortgage based on legal necessity, immorality, and coercion. The court exercised discretion in not allowing a sale and dismissed the appeal.
Issues: Challenge of compromise decree by minor, liability of family members, challenge of mortgage on grounds of legal necessity and immorality, coercion plea, decree for sale vs foreclosure
Ratio Decidendi: The compromise decree was binding, and the mortgagee was entitled to enforce the mortgage against the whole family. Challenges to the mortgage based on legal necessity, immorality, and coercion were rejected. The court exercised discretion in not allowing a sale.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed with costs.
1. This is an appeal by defendants 5 to 9 in a suit on a mortgage dated 11-1-1921 (Ex. P-3) for Rs. 30,000 executed by three brothers Shamrao, Govindrao and Shankar. Of these Shankar was a minor and was represented by his eldest brother Shamrao who acted as his guardian. The mortgage was in favour of defendant 1. On 24-4-1934 he and his sons assigned it to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs sue on it.
2. The following genealogical tree will show the relationship between the defendants, or rather those with whom we are concerned in this appeal.
JHANABAPU = Parbatibai _______________ |_________________ | | | Shamrao=Saraswati Govindrao Shankar (Defendant 4) (Defendant 5) (Defendant 6 _______|_______ ______|___________ W. Nanibai.) | | | | Ramrao Ganeshrao Vyankatrao Manekrao (Deft. 6) (Deft. 7) (Deft. 8) (Deft. 9.)
Defendants 4 and 5, Shamrao and Govindrao are dead and are represented by. their respective sons who were already on the record. Defendant 6 Shankar is also dead and is represented by his widow Mt. Nanibai.
3. The defence to the action is considered in stages. We will deal first with Shankar's position. He was a minor at the date of the mortgage. The lower appellate Court finds that none of the debts were incurred by the father of the mortgagors Jhanabapu. It also finds that the debts were not for legal necessity. Accordingly, the defendants state that Shankar's share is not liable.
4. The answer to this contention is that the matter is now res judicata. In the year 1923 Shankar and his mother Parbatibai (Shankar was then still a minor) sued Shamrao and Govindrao for partition; the suit is civil Suit No. 9 of 1923. The mortgagee Narsappa was joined as a defendant to the case. Shanker raised the questions of legal necessity and the like. The plaint is Ex. P-18. The mortgagee did not oppose the partition but pleaded that the mortgage was binding on the whole body of coparceners. This plea was taken in Ex. P-14.
5. In another statement (Ex. p. 13) the mortgagee also pleaded in the alternative that if the mortgage were found not to be binding on the minor Shankar's interest then the items of the joint family property should as far as possible be allotted to the shares of Shamrao and Govindrao.
6. The brothers of Shankar also contested (he suit. One of the pleas taken by the two brothers was to the effect that the plaintiff Shankar was not the son of Jhanabapu. That implied that Shankar's mother Parbatibai had been immoral and that Shankar was her illegitimate son. That is not stated in so many words in the statement (Ex. P-19), but it is the necessary effect of what they say. We refer to this because of the plea of coercion which we will have to consider at a later stage.
7. The parties to this litigation compromised their dispute. The compromise petition (Ex. P. 15) was signed by all the parties including the mortgagee who was represented by a pleader Mr. D.V. Gharpure. The portion of the compromise which relates to the mortgagee is as follows: The petition first of all sets out that three of the instalments due on the mortgage have been fully paid together with interest and that only seven remained. Then it continues:
The liability of the plaintiffs and the defendants 1 to 4 will be 1/3rd and 2/3rd respectively. With regard to defendant 5 it be decided in this compromise that the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 4 are all liable for the remaining mortgage debt and all the conditions in the mortgage-deed.
8. The plaintiff Shankar who was then a minor was represented in the litigation by his mother Parbatibai who acted as his next friend.
He was represented by a senior pleader Mr. Lule, The Court considered whether it should accord sanction to the compromise and reached the conclusion that the compromise was for the benefit of the minor and after stating out its reasons sanctioned the compromise. This will be found in Ex. P-3.
9. Following this a compromise decree was drawn up. The part of the decree which relates to the mortga
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