1946 Supreme(Nagpur) 89
HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
Hemeon
LAXMAN SHRIKRISHNA ALEGAONKAR – Appellant
Versus
DAYABHAI RAMCHANDRA BHATIA – Respondent
Decided on : 28-10-1946
The interpretation of Section 179, Criminal P.C. and the limitation of the 'consequence' to the offense being tried.
Headnote:
Jurisdiction - Cheque Endorsement - Interpretation of Section 179, Criminal P.C.
Fact of the Case:
The non-applicant was prosecuted for offenses under Sections 406 and 420, Penal Code, but was discharged due to lack of jurisdiction. The applicant, a firm, held a cheque which was lost in transit and subsequently cashed by the non-applicant at a different location.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found that the consequence referred to in Section 179, Criminal P.C. is confined to that which is an ingredient of the offense for which an accused person is being tried. The Court upheld the findings of the lower courts and dismissed the application.
Issues: Jurisdiction, Interpretation of Section 179, Criminal P.C., Cheque Endorsement
Ratio Decidendi: The consequence referred to in Section 179, Criminal P.C. is limited to that which is an ingredient of the offense for which an accused person is being tried. The appropriate Court for trial is determined by the location where the offense was committed or the consequence ensued.
Final Decision: The application was dismissed, affirming the findings of the lower courts regarding the lack of jurisdiction.
Hemeon, J—The non-applicant, Dayabhai, son of Ramchandra Bhatia, Gujarathi, resident of Bohari, taluq Bardoli, district Surat, was prosecuted at the instance of the applicant Laxman who is a munim of the firm of Dinkar Trimbak and Co., Akola, Under Sections 406 and 420, Penal Code in the Court of the Honorary Magistrate, first class, Akola, but the latter discharged am on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction, to try him. The Sessions Judge, West Berar Division, upheld that finding and the applicant has now come up in revision to this Court.
2. His case briefly stated was as follows: His firm is a holder in due course of a cheque of Rs. 250 drawn on 3-7-1943 by Chhaganlal Zaverchand of Balimoria in favour of Gandabhai Gopalji on a Bombay branch of the Baroda Bank. The firm endorsed the cheque in favour of the Dhutpapeshwar Company of Panwel and despatched it to that organisation by post, but sit was lost in transit and the applicant apprised the Bank of Baroda of this. He also sent notices to the drawer and drawee of the cheque as well as to all prior endorsees including the non-applicant. The drawer of the cheque thereafter informed him that he had issued a duplicate cheque in favour of the original drawee. The cheque subsequently reached the non applicant, but instead of passing it after endorsement to Dr. Sharma, in whose favour he had endorsed the original cheque he actually presented it for, and secured payment.
3. An offence is Under Section 177, Criminal P.C., ordinarily inquired into and tried by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed; and in the present case it was clear that no offence was committed in Akola. Section 179 ibid, however, provides that: When a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which has been done, and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been, done, or any such consequence has ensued.
4. The two Courts below held, and rightly in my view, that the ''consequence'' referred to in that section is confined to that which is an ingredient of the offence for which an accused person is being tried.
5. It is true that Niyogi, J. (then A.J.C.), relying on Emperor v. Ramratan Chunilal, 1922 46 ILR(Bom) 641 held to the contrary in Trikamji Parmanandji v. Emperor but he made no reference in that case to the reported decision of Halifax Benerji v. Potnis,1924 AIR(Nag) 253 which that Bombay case was dissented from.
6. He also made no reference to the Full Bench case in In re Jivandas Savchand, 1930 AIR(Bom) 490 in which the earlier Bombay case was overruled and it was held that the ''consequence'' in Section 179, Criminal P.C. is the consequence which must form part of the offences charged. Mitra also at page 573 of his Code of Criminal Procedure, 10th edition, notes that all the Chartered High Courts are now agreed that the ''consequence'' is confined to that which is an ingredient of the offence for which an accused person is being tried.
7. In K.P. Ghiara v. D.P.R. Cassad Criminal Revn. No. 500 of 1946, D/- 12-9-1946 decided by me on 21-9-1946, I had expressed agreement with the view taken in Daityari Tripatti v. Subodh Chandra Chaudhuri, 1942 AIR(Cal) 575 that Section 179, Criminal: P.C. applies to those offences which by their very definition consist of an act and its consequence, for example, culpable homicide, but it does not apply to a criminal breach of trust. An offence of criminal breach of trust can, as is clear from the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 181, Criminal P.C., be inquired info or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any part of the property which is the subject of the Offence was received or retained by the accused person or the offence was committed
8. It follows from this that if the non applicant had, as was asserted by the applicant's learned Counsel, cashed t