The application for transfer of the decree and the time spent before the Debt Conciliation Board were considered steps-in-aid of execution, and the time spent before the Board could be deducted under Section 23 of the C.P. Debt Conciliation Act.

Hidayatullah, J—This is a miscellaneous (First) appeal against the order of Mr. Adharsinha, Subordinate Judge, First Class, Chhindwara, in Execution Case in civil Suit No. 8B of 1934 passed on 12-8 1941.

2. The facts are quite simple. The appellant (decree-holder) obtained a decree against the respondent (judgment-debtor) on 16-8-1931 in Civil Suit No. 8 of 1934. On 6-8-1937 the decree-holder applied for transfer of the decree from Chbind wara to Nagpur and on 13-8-1937 the decree was ordered to be transferred and a certificate of non-satisfaction was also granted In the meantime, the judgment-debtor had applied for instalments and a stay order was passed by this Court on 21-9-1937. On this the Court recalled the certificate on 27-9-1937. The judgment-debtor was asked to furnish security but he failed to do so and on 5-11-1937 the Court ordered that the certificate be sent again for necessary action. Thereafter the decree-holder applied for transfer of the decree on 26 9-1940 and on 12-8-1941 the application was dismissed by the learned Judge as being barred by limitation.

The decree-holder tries to save limitation in various ways. His first contention is that from 20-4-1938 till 2512-1938 the matter was pending before the Debt Conciliation Board and hence under Section 23, C.P. Debt Conciliation Act that period must be excluded. He further says that the judgment-debtor in his application to the Board had shown this decretal amount as being due and this amounts to an acknowledgment under Section 19, Limitation Act and gives a fresh period of limitation from 20-4-1938, which is the date of the application before the Board Ex. 0-4 He also says that on 30-9-1937 the counsel for the judgment debtor admitted the liability for the decretal amount in his memo of appeal before the High Court and therefore that too gives a fresh start of limitation and the present application of 26-9-1940 would be within 8 years from that date. It is obvious that even if one of these contentions is correct the limitation is saved and the execution is competent.

3. Mr. Bobde who appeared for the respondent attacked the first application for transfer of the decree and said that that application did not save limitation because it cannot be said to be 'a step-in-aid of execution' because before there can be a step-in-aid of execution, there must be an execution pending. He relied on Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar, 1922 AIR(Mad) 79 in support of his contention. There is a considerable difference of opinion on the question whether the phrase 'step-in-aid' of execution postulates that there must be an execution pending. Even in the Madras High Court the decisions are not uniform and very recently their Lordships of the Privy Council noted this difference of opinion though it was not necessary in that case to pronounce any opinion. See Annamalai Chettiar v. Valliammai Achi. The view expressed in Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar, 1922 AIR(Mad) 79 was doubted in M. Krishna Pattar v. Seetharama Pattar, 1926 AIR(Mad) 1178 and so far that High Court is concerned the matter is now settled by the Full Bench decision in Ayi v. Solai, 1945 AIR(Mad) 139 which expressly overrules Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Aiyar, 1922 AIR(Mad) 79

4. It is, therefore, not necessary that there must be an execution pending before action by the decree-holder can be described as a step-in-aid of execution. This is also the view expressed in Risal Singh v. Lal Singh, 1939 AIR(All) 483, Jagdeo Narain Singh v. Bhubaneshwari Koer, 1928 AIR(Pat) 612

5. A similar view appears to have been taken by Pollock, J. in Prayagdas v. Indirabai. These cases have my respectful concurrence and I am of opinion that a step in aid of execution can be taken before an application for execution of the decree has been made in Court. It has been held in a large number of cases that an application for the transfer of a decree to another Court is a step-in-aid of execution. See Sita Ram Rai v.