The main legal point established in the judgment is that the agent's power to 'compromise' includes the power to refer the dispute to arbitration, and counsel in India have inherent powers to compromise claims and refer disputes to arbitration without the authority or consent of the client, unless expressly countermanded.

1. The questions referred concern the powers of an agent and counsel respectively to refer a dispute pending in a Court to arbitration without express authority from the principal.

2. The facts briefly are that the appellant sued for possession and certain other reliefs. The trial proceeded at some length (evidence was recorded, there was an appeal, a remand and so forth) and eventually an application was made to the Court to have the matter referred to the sole arbitration of one Tulsidas. The application was allowed. The matter was referred. Both sides appeared before the arbitrator through counsel. He heard them at length. Then he gave his award. It went against the plaintiff and the plaintiff now challenges it on various grounds. Of these, we are only concerned with the powers of the agent and counsel of the plaintiff. The objection is this. Neither of the parties to the suit signed the application for reference. It was signed by one Mohanlal on behalf of the plaintiff and by the plaintiff's counsel (an advocate), and on the other side by one Chunilal and the defendant's counsel. Mohanlal held a special power of attorney (a khas mukhtyarnama) and his counsel also had a vakalatnama. Neither of these documents confers express authority to refer the dispute to arbitration. The plaintiff challenges their respective powers to make the reference on his behalf. In the two lower Courts the authority of the defendant's agent Chunnilal, and of his counsel, was also challenged, but we are not concerned with them in this reference. The order of reference only discusses the plaintiff's position, and though the questions referred are general, they must of course be read in conjunction with the order. Accordingly, we say nothing about the powers of Chunnilal and the defendant's counsel.

3. Now so far as Mohanlal's power is concerned it was argued on the one hand that the power to refer is included not only in the words to compromise and to sign compromise petitions,'' but also in the more general clause and whatever would be required to be done in the conduct of this suit would be done by the agent and the same would be binding on me as if I had done the same.

4. As against this, the other side contended that a power to refer is not included in the power to compromise and that the general clause is restricted to matters done in the conduct of the suit, and that this does not include a power to remove the dispute from the jurisdiction of the Court and transfer it elsewhere. A more fundamental objection was also taken. It was said that the word 'compromise' is a free English translation of the vernacular words ''apsat tad-jod'' which, being literally translated mean ''to give and take between ourselves.'' It was said that even if one of the meanings of the English word compromise is a reference to arbitration that is because the term has acquired a technical or secondary significance in the English Courts which cannot be extended to a vernacular term literally restricted to a giving and taking ''between ourselves,'' especially as there is no case law on the point in India and accordingly it cannot be contended that these vernacular expressions have acquired an extended significance beyond their literal meaning because of time-honoured practice or custom.

5. This raises the question whether we can go behind the terms of reference and construe the power. The question referred, so far as this is concerned, is whether an express authority to compromise given to an agent includes power to refer a pending suit to arbitration.

6. It will be seen that the English word 'compromise' is used. Had the power of attorney been in English, or if the English term had been introduced into the vernacular document, we think it possible that a power to refer to arbitration would have been included because that is one of the meanings of the English word ''compromise'' as used in Courts of law. See as to this Chanbasappa v. Basalingayya, 1927 AIR(Bom) 665 and