The judgment emphasizes the limited nature of a Court's powers of review and the importance of legal compliance, stating that deliberate decisions reached by the Court, even if wrong, are final and cannot be reviewed unless falling directly within the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1.

Bose, J—On 4-1-1945 the trial Court directed the plaintiff to make discovery of his account books on 291-1945. On the next hearing, 29-1-1945, the defendant complained that no discovery had been made. The Court then fixed the case for 9-4-1945. Since no discovery was made even on that date the defendant asked that the suit be dismissed for want of prosecution under Order 11, Rule 21, Civil P.C. This was done for the following reasons set out in the order-sheet:

The plaintiff was very negligent. He should have, if he had no account books, filed an affidavit to that effect. Now the defendant (sic) cannot give evidence that 'the plaintiff has no account books.

(The word 'defendant' in the order-sheet is clearly a slip for 'plaintiff.') It seems that the plaintiff entered the witness-box and wanted to depose on oath that he had no account books. The Court would not allow him to do this because, in its view, he had not complied with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and had not filed an affidavit as the Code requires. The order was then signed.

2. Later in the day, after the order had been signed (the time of the signing of the order is given as 12-12 P.M.) the plaintiff's counsel made two applications asking that the order be set aside. The main grounds given were, first that the plaintiff's counsel had informed the defendant's counsel that the plaintiff had no account books as he never maintained any. This according to the plaintiff's counsel occurred in January 1945. Another ground given was that the plaintiff's pleader was under the impression that as the plaintiff was entering the witness-box he would state on oath that he had no account books and consequently was unable to give discovery. The application also states that when objection was taken to the want of an affidavit the plaintiff stated that he would be prepared to make an affidavit within half an hour. But the Court did not grant this and dismissed the suit under Order 11, Rule 21, Civil P.C.

3. The Court entertained this application on the same day and set aside its order on 26-6-1945. The question I have to decide in revision is whether it had jurisdiction to do so and whether it was otherwise proper for it to make such an order.

4. On the question of jurisdiction I am clear that the Court had no jurisdiction. Order 43, Rule 1, Civil P.C., provides an appeal from an order dismissing a suit for want of prosecution under Order 11, Rule 21 of the Code. Order 47, Rule 1, provides for a review. Therefore two distinct remedies are provided in the Code, against an order made in the circumstances like the present. That being the case, it is not possible to attract the provisions of Section 151 and invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. This was stated in emphatic terms by me in a Division Bench case, (which in any event binds me), reported in Sheolal v. Jugal Kishore, I stated there, (the Honourable the Chief justice concurred):

What we desire most emphatically to emphasise is that not only must the power so conferred be sparingly used but that Courts have no power whatever to resort to Section 151, when the matter is expressly dealt with in the Code, and that if they do so they act without jurisdiction and their orders are revisable.

5. Much the same principle is laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh a case under the Limitation Act. The proposition contended for before their Lordships was that in a case of hardship the Courts had some judicial discretion to relieve a party from the operation of the Limitation Act, but the argument would of course apply to any Act. Their Lordships stated:

It is enough to say that there is no authority to support the proposition contended for. In their Lordships' opinion it is impossible to hold that, in a matter which is governed by the Act, an Act which in some limited respects gives the Court a statutory discretion, there can be implied in the Court, outside the