1946 Supreme(Nagpur) 57
HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
HASINABAI W/O FAKARDUDDIN AND ANR – Appellant
Versus
SHRIKISANDAS TIKAMDAS – Respondent
Decided on : 08-08-1946
The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the appointment of a trustee, the legal representative's role, and the devolution of trust property under the Trusts Act and the Civil Procedure Code.
Headnote:
Trustee - Right of Suit - 73, Trusts Act - 2(11), Civil P.C. - The court discussed the appointment of a trustee and the legal representative's role in nominating a successor under Section 73, Trusts Act. It interpreted the definition of 'legal representative' under Section 2(11), Civil P.C. and clarified the devolution of trust property. The court emphasized that the successor in office is the legal representative for the purposes of a suit, and the trust property devolves upon the successor under Section 75, Trusts Act.
Fact of the Case:
The suit was based on a promissory note, and the plaintiff, as the surviving trustee of a trust, brought the suit. The defendants denied the plaintiff's right to sue, leading to a dispute over the appointment of a trustee and the interpretation of the promissory note.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the plaintiff had the right to sue as a trustee based on the interpretation of the promissory note and the trust deed. It also addressed the issue of payment made to the trust and concluded that there was no valid discharge of the debt by the defendants.
Issues: The issues revolved around the plaintiff's right to sue as a trustee, the interpretation of the promissory note, and the validity of the payment made to the trust.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the promissory note, the Trusts Act, and the Civil Procedure Code, emphasizing the legal representative's role and the devolution of trust property.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the court modified the decree to account for interest and denied the defendants' claim for credit. The parties were directed to bear their own costs, and the decree was not to be executed unless the conditions under the Debt Conciliation Act were satisfied.
1. This is a second appeal from the judgment and decree passed by Mr. J.N. Haksar, Additional District Judge, Nimar on 17-11-1939 in civil Appeal No. 10B of 1939, reversing the decision of the trial Court. The suit was based upon a promissory note, dated 11-5-1932 (Ex. p-l) and the plaintiff brought the suit as the sole surviving trustee of a trust. In the plaint the plaintiff is described as trustee, by virtue of a sale-deed dated 6th June 1921, executed by Mt. Kadhabai, wife of Kishan Das, and others, Panch and Wahiwatdar of Gujrathi Mod Community, Burhanpur.
The defendants denied the right of the plaintiff to bring the suit and the trial Court dismissed the suit. The first appellate Court re-versed the decree of the trial Court. Hence the defendants filed this appeal.
2. The only question upon merits is whether the plaintiff has a right of suit as the defendants do not deny execution or consideration. Before this part of the case is taken up, there is one other point in connection with the death of the plaintiff and the substitution of Seth Shrikishandas, son of Tikamdas of Burhanpur as the respondent which needs decision. It is argued that. Seth Shrikishandas who is nominated by the legal representatives of the late Seth Thakurdas (plaintiff) as a trustee is not the legal representative of Seth Thakurdas for the purposes of Order 22, Civil P.C.
3. Section 73, Trusts Act (2 [II] of 1882) provides for the appointment of a trustee, when the last surviving trustee either dies, or is unfit or refuses to act. In such circumstances (inter alia) the legal representatives of the last surviving and continuing trustee can nominate the successor. Mr. Fida Hussain refers to Section 2(11), Civil P.C., which reads:
'Legal representative' means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued and argues that because a trustee sues in a representative capacity we have first to find out the person on whom the trust property has devolved and it is that person who is the legal representative and who alone can make the nomination of the successor, under Section 73, Trusts Act. He says that the law is defective because it is obvious that the devolution of the trust property cannot take place till a successor is appointed.
4. There is no need to read the definition from the Civil Procedure Code into the Trusts] Act. The trust property has devolved upon the present respondent (Seth Shrikishandas) under Section 75, Trusts Act as he has been legally appointed by the legal representatives of the sole surviving and continuing trustee. The words ''legal representative of the trustee in Section 73, Trusts Act, mean his legal representative in his personal capacity, and not qua trustee. On the other hand for the purposes of a suit the words 'legal representative' mean the successor in office on whom the trust property devolves. Sir Dinshaw Mulla's comment under Section 2(11), Civil P.C., at p. 12 of his Edn. 11 is quite clear:
Thus on the death of a trustee or of a shebait of a mutt, his successor in office and not his executor or heir is the legal representative, and the suit would be continued by or against the successor under Order XXII, Rule 3 or 4.
5. In Section 2(11), Civil P.C. the legal representative is the successor to the trusteeship and the trust property under Section 75, Trusts Act. In Section 73 the person who makes the appointment is the legal representative of the trustee in his individual and personal capacity. It is a well-known rule of interpretation of statutes that if one construction leads to absurdity and another makes the statute logical, the latter construction is to ' be preferred, for every effort should be made to make sense and not nonsense of legislation. In our opinion, therefore, the meanin