The main legal point established in the judgment is that the inalienability condition imposed by the sanad applied to the right to receive the allowance, not to the specific amount as it accrued every year, rendering the allowance not exempt from attachment.

1. This appeal and Miscellaneous (Second) Appeal No. 151 of 1941 arise out of two execution proceedings

started by two creditors separately against the respondent Raje Chainsing. Both the creditors applied for a prohibitory order by way of attachment of the sum of Rs. 2210-5 7 which the respondent receives every year from the Government through the Divisional Forest Officer, Akola. That amount is payable every year as an allowance by way of compensation for forest dues under a sanad granted to the respondent's ancestors by Government on 28th October 1896, The executing Court held that the allowances which are payable to the judgment-debtor were not liable to attachment. Toe lower appellate Court, agreeing with the executing Court, dismissed the appeal. This order governs the disposal of both the appeals.

2. Three contentions are put forward on behalf of the appellants decree-holders: (1) That the contention as to the attachability or otherwise of the amount in the bands of Government is barred by virtue of two decisions one reported in Ramprasad v. Kodu and another Govindram v. Raje Chainsingh Misc. Appeal No. 249 of 1937 (2) That the respondent had himself paid the amounts of Rs. 400 and Rs. 200 out of the amount under consideration in the previous execution applications so as to preclude him from pleading that it was uh-attachable; (3) That the condition of inalienability imposed by the sanad related to the right to receive the allowance and not the allowance as it became actually payable every year.

3. Tne first two points are devoid of any substance. There was no plea that the decision in Ramprasad v. Kodu operated as res judicata obviously because the parties there were different. Nor can the decision in Govindram v. Raje Chainsingh Misc. Appeal No. 249 of 1937 do so as the learned Chief Justice himself made it clear, in rejecting a review application in his order refusing leave to file Letters Patent appeal, that anything decided by him was not of a binding nature since the money had already been received by the judgment-debtor before the attachment.

4. The second point had been abandoned in the lower appellate Court, and it is in itself devoid of force as the payments made in the previous executions cannot possibly operate as estoppel against the respondent.

5. That leaves only the last point which involves the consideration of the question whether the money, while it is in the hands of the Government and before it reaches the hands of the judgment debtor, is liable to attachment. For the proper appreciation of the point in issue it is necessary to state that under the sanad issued to the ancestor of the respondent by the Resident at Hyderabad under the authority of the Government of India, four villages, namely; Anar, Rohin Khirkhi, Salwan and Kbardeo, were granted as a Jagir along with certain money allowances inter alia by way of compensation on account of forest dues amounting to Rs. 1561-15-7 which were payable annually subject to the following conditions among others:

That the said Jagir and the said allowances, viz. Jaglia cess and compensation for forest dues, being service grants hall on no account be alienated by the said Raja or his successors either by sale or mortgage or in any other manner without the previous sanction of the Resident in writing.

6. The learned Counsel for the appellant conceded that for the sake of argument the allowances may well be regarded as forming part and parcel of the Jagir grant. It is on this footing that he based his argument that although the sanad described the Jagir and the allowances as service grants there is no obligation imposed upon the grantee to perform any public service. It was in reality a grant for the maintenance of the grantee and his successors.

7. In Venkatarama Ayyar v. Chandrasekhara, 1921 AIR(Mad) 292 it was held that unenfranchised inam lands granted not for future public or private services but as a matter of favour for the maintenance of the donee and hi