The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the time requisite for obtaining a copy under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act and its application to the computation of the period of limitation for filing an appeal.

Sen, J—Two questions arise for decision at this stage: (1) whether the appeal was filed within time, and (2) if not whether the appellant had made out sufficient cause for admission of the appeal under Section 5, Limitation Act.

2. The decree against which the present appeal was filed was passed on 24th July 1945. The appeal was filed on 12th November 1945. i.e. on the 111th day. nth November 1945 was Sunday at if the limitation expired on that date, the appeal filed on the next day, i.e., 12th November 1945 would have been within time. The office put up a note that the appeal was barred by limitation by two days and in computing the period of limitation it allowed 19 days as the time requisite for obtaining the copy and stated that the appeal was barred by two days.

3. The counsel for the appellant filed an application on 29th November 1945 under Section 5, Limitation Act, stating reasons why the appeal was not filed earlier the application was sup-ported by an affidavit of the-counsel. The reason assigned was that while reading the, endorsement in ''column 8 of the table on the back of the certified copy of the judgment he read 28-91945' an 20-9-1945' and he made calculation accordingly. The figure 8' in 28' has been so written in the endorsement on the judgment that it could be mistaken for 25'. I accept the explanation of the counsel as true and hold that the mistake was a bona fide one and that sufficient cause had been made out under Section 6, Limitation Act, for admission of the appeal.

The limitation for filing an appeal to this Court is 90 days from the date of the decree or order appealed from: see Article 156, Limitation Act, In computing the, period, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed against has to be excluded: see Section 12(2), Limitation Act.

4. The application for copy was made on 3rd September 1945. In column 7 18-9-1945' is noted as the date on which an intimation was sent to the appellant to supply funds. In column 8, 28 9-1948' is noted as the date on Which funds were supplied. The copy was delivered on 1st October 1945. The appeal was filed on 12th November 1945. The office has allowed 19 days' period from 3rd September 1945 to 18th September 1945 and from 29th September 1945 to 1st October 1945 as the time requisite for obtaining a copy. The learned Counsel for the respondent supported the objection made by the office that the appeal was barred by limitation.

5. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that he was entitled to 28th September 1945' when the amount was paid in computing the period requisite for obtaining a copy, and if that is allowed the applicant is entitled to exclude 20 days as the time requisite for obtaining a copy. The appeal would be within limitation as in that case the limitation expired on Sunday the 11th November and the appeal filed on the next day was within limitation.

6. In Pramatha Nath Roy v. William Arther Lee, 1922 AIR(PC) 352 it was held that no period could be regarded as 'requisite' under Section 12(2), Limitation Act, which need not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain a copy of the decree or order. If that test is applied the appellant is entitled to exclude 28th September 1945 as he took reason-able and proper steps in obtaining a copy of the decree because he paid the funds on that day.

7. In J.N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar Firm, 1928 AIR(PC) 103 it was held that the word 'requisite' was a strong word and it means something more than the word required; it meant 'properly required,' and it throws upon the appellant necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default.

8. In some cases the applicant has been allowed the entire period from the date on which demand is made for funds and on which the funds: were paid and the intervening period.

9. In Kishore Chand v. Bahadur, 1936 AIR(Lah) 771 it was held that an applicant is entitled to exclu