The main legal point established in the judgment is the entitlement of an illegitimate son to maintenance under Hindu law, the inheritance rules governing the entitlement to maintenance, and the discretion of the court in determining the quantum of maintenance and the claim for arrears.

1. One Durgaprasad was possessed of a group of villages in the Betul district known as the Keshia estate. He died about the year 1900 leaving no brothers but an infant daughter Rampyari Bai, and the estate was taken under the Court of wards until the year 1910. Rampyari Bai married Ramdin Awasthi who died in 1931. She herself died in the following year, 1932, leaving a daughter who was married to Ramshanker Misra and an adopted son Krishna Kumar who was adopted after his father's death. For purposes of the appeal arising out of the suit the adoption is admitted by the plaintiff, who is an illegitimate son of Durgaprasad who was a Brahmin.

2. Sheoprasad brought a suit for maintenance against Krishna Kumar, who is a minor under the tutelage of the Court of wards and also against Sheodularey, the son of Radhelal who was a sister's son of Durgaprasad. Radhelal had claimed the estate but died and litigation between Sheodularey and Krishna Kumar in respect of the estate is continuing, Ramshankar Misra was also at one time a claimant to the estate but has not been included in the suit out of which this appeal arises. Sheoprasad's claim was for maintenance at the rate of Rs. 60 a month and arrears dating from January 1931 from which date he claimed that Mt. Rampyari Bai who had maintained him before had ceased to maintain him. He was awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs. 30 a month which was ordered to be charged on the estate of Durgaprasad in the hands of his grandson Krishna Kumar, but was denied arrears. The appeal is by Krishna Kumar on whose behalf it is contended that in order to be entitled to maintenance the plaintiff was required by the religious texts to behave docilely to Krishna Kumar and that he had forfeited any claim by having set himself up in opposition to him. Further it was contended that whatever right Sheoprasad had against Durgaprasad that right ceased when Durgaprasad's estate went into another family. There is also a cross-objection by Sheoprasad re-asserting the amount and the arrears claimed in the plaint.

3. There can be no question that Sheoprasad, as an illegitimate son of a Brahmin, is entitled to maintenance. In the Mitakshara in Vijnaneswara's commentary of the Institutes of Yajnavalkya, ch. I, Section 12, verse 3, the following is stated:

From the mention of Sudra in this'' place, (referring to the previous two verses) the son begotten by a man of a regenerate class on a female slave, does not obtain a share even by the father's choice, nor the whole estate after his death. But, if be docile he receives only maintenance.

4. We shall refer to the question of docility later. It has been argued before us first on the strength of the decision in Maharajah of Venkatagiri v. Rajeswararao, 1939 AIR(Mad) 614 that the right of maintenance disappears when the estate lawfully passes into the hands of strangers, and it is contended that this is what has happened here. In our opinion, the contention is entirely incorrect. Assuming, as has been done by the plaintiff in this case, that Krishna Kumar was adopted by his mother, the estate is still that of the propositus Durgaprasad. By the rules of succession in the Mitakshara a daughter's son, although he is strictly a bandhu or bhinnagotra sapinda as his relationship passes through a female, inherits along with gotraja sapindas by virtue of express texts: vide Srinivasa v. Dandayudapani and Karuppai v. Sankaranarayanan Chetty and his place in the inheritance is after the son, the grandson, the widow and the daughter and he would succeed in preference to the other claimant, namely Sheodularey, who is the son's son of Durgaprasad's sister. He has accordingly succeeded to Durgaprasad's estate and Durgaprasad's illegitimate son is entitled to be maintained out of that estate: Hargobind Kauri v. Dharam Singh and Vellaiyappa Chetty v. Natarajan.

5. Next it was argued that the property is not joint family property, and, if it is separate property then there is no liabi