1946 Supreme(Nagpur) 7
HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
Bose
PUSARAM MANIKLAL IZARDAR – Appellant
Versus
DEORAO GOPALRAO MALI – Respondent
Decided on : 24-01-1946
The main legal point established is that a tenant's claim of possession based on an agreement for sale and subsequent possession transfer must be valid to resist a landlord's right to ejectment.
Headnote:
ejectment - landlord-tenant dispute - Section 145, Criminal P.C. - Section 53-A, T.P. Act
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, as the landlord, sued for ejectment as the defendant refused to deliver possession after the expiry of the lease. The defendant claimed possession based on an agreement for sale and subsequent possession transfer to a third party.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the defendant's claim of possession based on the agreement for sale and subsequent possession transfer was not valid. The court also held that the Section 145 proceedings and the defendant's plea of attornment to a third party did not bar the plaintiff's suit for ejectment.
Issues: Dispute over possession after lease expiry, validity of possession transfer to a third party, applicability of Section 53-A, T.P. Act, and compliance with Section 145, Criminal P.C.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the defendant's claim of possession based on the agreement for sale and subsequent possession transfer was not valid. The court also clarified that the Section 145 proceedings and the defendant's plea of attornment to a third party did not bar the plaintiff's suit for ejectment.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the defendant's claim and upheld the plaintiff's right to ejectment.
Bose, J—The suit is for ejectment. The plaintiff is the landlord. On 13-3-1939 his guardian, he being a minor, admittedly leased out the fields in question to the defendant for a little over a year. The lease was to expire on 15-4-1940. There is a registered deed of lease. There is no dispute about these facts.
2. The plaintiff's case is that on the expiry of the lease the defendant refused to deliver possession and so he sues for ejectment. The defence to the action is that the defendant had delivered possession to three persons, Sohanlal and two others, in pursuance of directions given by the plaintiff's guardian in Ex. D-10, a document executed on the same day as the lease, namely 13-3-1939.
3. This document is an agreement for sale. The recitals state that the plaintiff's father owed Sohanlal and the others money on a mortgage. In order to discharge the debt the property in suit was to be sold to Sohanlal, etc., but owing to a legal hitch (the property was then under the management of the Collector) it could not be sold forthwith and so this agreement for sale was executed. It was stated in it that the sale would be executed in a month. The agreement then recited that the property had been let out to the defendant Pusaram for a year commencing from that very day and added:
After the expiry of the year you may take possession. I have no objection whatever.
4. There is no doubt that possession was duly handed over in pursuance of the above directions because there is a receipt to that effect by Sohanlal and the others. They admit receipt of possession. After that they in their turn leased the property to the defendant for another year. The document is Ex. D-2. It is dated 29-8-1940, which it will be observed is some days before the expiry of the plaintiff's lease. That was to expire on 15-4-1940; That would, however, make no difference to its validity. It is open to a lessee to surrender before he need if he so desires, and if the lessor or his nominee is prepared to accept the surrender no one can cavil at the arrangement. Alternatively, seeing that there was a release to the same lessee it would be open to the parties to regard the transaction as having effect from the date of the expiry of the prior lease. Either way it would constitute valid delivery of possession in the eye of the law. But it is essential that all parties to such a transaction should be in agreement, namely the lessor, the lessee and the lessor's nominee.
5. Another complication arises here because, on the expiry of the lease, that is, on 15-4-1940, disputes arose regarding the right to possession. Proceedings under Section 145, Criminal P.C., were accordingly started and the Tahsildar was appointed a receiver and placed in possession of the property. He auctioned the leasehold rights for a year and the defendant purchased. Accordingly the defendant was at the date of suit in possession as a lessee of the receiver. This, however, would not operate as a bar to this suit.
6. Section 145 proceedings are only temporary proceedings designed to prevent a breach of the peace. They are subject to the decision of civil Courts. It is only an accident that the defendant purchased the leasehold rights. Had a stranger purchased it would have been no bar to a suit against the defendant. Possession would of course have been postponed till the end of the lease but the suit would have been competent. I cannot see that it makes any difference because the defendant is the lessee. His capacity as lessee from the receiver must be distinguished from his capacity as defendant in the suit. The plaintiff's right to possession would probably be postponed till the end of the lease, if the tahsildar had power to lease and his appointment as receiver was intra vires--points which it is unnecessary to decide here--but thereafter the plaintiff would be entitled to execute his decree. In fact the correct procedure in such a case would be for the defendant to hand back possession to