The judgment established the continued jurisdiction of Magistrates of the first class under the Child Marriage Restraint Act despite the repeal and the implications of the distribution memorandum on jurisdiction.

Bose, J—This is a petition for revision made by the complainant in proceedings under the Child Marriage Restraint Act (19 [xix] of 1929).

2. The applicant filed a complaint under the said Act on 18-8-1945 in the Court of Mr. R.D. Doongaji who is a Magistrate of the first class. Mr. Doongaji took cognizance of the complaint and later transferred it to Mr. R.S. Malaviya on 11-4-1945. He was succeeded by Mr. Misra who rejected it on the ground that the complaint was barred by time on the date on which the matter came to Mr. Malaviya.

3. The limitation is imposed by Section 9 of Act XIX[19] of 1938. The limitation is one year. It is admitted that the complaint was within limitation on 13-3-1945 when Mr. Doongaji took cognizance of the complaint and it is admitted that the matter was beyond the year on 11-4-1945 when it came before Mr. Malaviya.

4. These facts raise several questions of importance. The first is whether either Mr. Doongaji or Mr. Malaviya or Mr. Misra had jurisdiction. It is contended that neither had because under the original Act of 1929 only a District Magistrate or a Presidency Magistrate could entertain such complaints. This jurisdiction was extended to Magistrates of the first class by an amending Act (19 [xix] of 1938). This amending Act was repealed by Act 25 [XXV] of 1942, therefore, it is argued, we are now thrown back to the original position, and Hemeon J. so decided in Criminal Revision No. 574 of 1945.

5. I am unable to accept this contention and with due respect I am of opinion that Hemeon J. was wrong because he has omitted to take notice of Section 4 of the repealing Act (25 [XXV] of 1942) which embodies a saving clause of a nature common to repealing Acts. That section enacts that The repeal by this Act of any enactment shall not affect any Act...in which such enactment has been...incorporated.

6. It seems to me that Act 19 [xix] of 1988 was incorporated in the earlier Act by its provisions. Section 3 of Act 19 [xix] of 1938, which is the relevant section here states that In Section 8 of the said Act ''(i.e. the original Act of 1929)'' for the words 'District Magistrate' the words 'Magistrate of the first class' shall be substituted.

7. Now when one substitutes one set of words for another one erases the original set and writes in the new. In other words, one incorporates the new words into the old enactment. A reference to the Oxford English Dictionary will show that this is one of the senses in which the word 'incorporate' is used. If that is so then Section 4 of the repealing Act (Act 25 [xxv] of 1942) directs that the repeal shall not affect such incorporated enactment. It follows that the words ''Magistrate of the first class'' which had been written into the original Act by the amending Act remain despite the repeal. Therefore Magistrates of the first class continue to have jurisdiction in spite of the repeal.

8. The same argument applies to Section 9 of the amending Act (Act 19 [xix] of 1938) which imposes the limitation of one year. Here also the words used in the amending Act are ''For Section 9 of the said Act the following shall be substituted.'' Therefore the limitation of one year still holds good despite the repeal.

9. The next question is whether Mr. Doongaji had jurisdiction for another reason. It was argued that such cases were either expressly or impliedly excluded from his jurisdiction by reason of a distribution memorandum of work issued by the District Magistrate. Mr. Doongaji was appointed a Magistrate of the first class, Wardha ''in the Wardha District, with powers to try as a Magistrate all offences not punishable with death.'' under Gazette Notification No. 2529-2815-XIX dated 4-11-1944.

10. Now Section 12(2), Criminal P.C., provides that all Magistrates of the first class shall have jurisdiction and powers throughout the district to which they are appointed. Therefore, prima facie, Mr. Doongaji had jurisdiction to entertain this complaint. But Section 12(1) limits this by e