The interpretation of Sections 12 and 13 of the Debt Conciliation Act and the application of these sections to determine the time-barred execution.

Grille, C J—This appeal arises out of proceedings before a Debt Conciliation Board. The appellant against whom money recoverable as a decree (vide Section 13(4), Debt Conciliation Act) was sought to be recovered claimed that execution was time-barred. This was held against him by the executing Court and also in first appeal, and he has now preferred a second appeal.

2. The facts are simple. The appellant is a pleader of Mandla. It is not clear how he claimed to be mainly an agriculturist, but it is to be presumed that this is correct. Nevertheless in debt conciliation proceedings an agreement was reached under the conditions of Section 12 of the Act with four creditors three of whom at least are tradesmen or firms of Jubbulpore, namely Vora Brothers, the Bombay Garage and the present respondent who owns a big grocery shop in Jubbulpore. The respondent had applied under Section 13(1), Debt Conciliation Act, to have a defaulting instalment recovered by the revenue authorities. The application was in respect of a defaulted kist of April 1940. The agreement is of 1935. The respondent obtained his certificate under Section 13(3) on 29-8-1941 and sought to execute it on 2-8-1943. He was then confronted with the objection by the present appellant that the Sub-Divisional Officer had no right to grant a certificate as a certificate had already been granted on 12-3-1940 in respect of the three other creditors under the agreement come to under the provisions of Section 12, and it was, also contended that since the agreement had ceased to subsist (vide Section 13(3)) on that day, namely 12-3-1940, and had become a fictional decree the respondent was out of time. Both these contentions together with a third, which was not pressed in the lower appellate Court, were repelled in the Courts below.

3. The argument pressed before me is that the agreement under Section 12 is one and indivisible, and the judgment of a Divisional Bench in Gopikisan v. Amarchand,1940 NLJ 67. is cited for this proposition. That is certainly true as far as that section itself is concerned in respect of the percentage of the total amount of debts of consenting debtors and the repercussion on certificates issued under Section 15 of the Act. Reference is also made to Shridhar v. Narayan,1939 AIR(Nag) 227. but the decision there does not really touch the point before me.

4. It is clear that Section 13 concerns itself with an application by a single creditor who has been disappointed of his instalment which was agreed to by the agreement mentioned in Section 12. It does not concern itself with the whole of the creditors as a body. This is clear from the wording of Sub-section (1) and the certificate which is given in Sub-section (3) refers to ''any part of the amount referred to therein,'' that is to say Sub-section (1). Therefore the certificate is granted in respect of what the individual creditor claims and such individual creditor is certainly not acting on behalf of what may be called the creditorial body, which may consist of any number of creditors, who have come to an agreement under Section 12. That this is so is also supported by the form of certificate which has been prescribed for use under Section 13(3) of the Act, vide form No. 6 on p. 27 of Edn. 3 of the Central Provinces and Berar Debt Legislation Pamphlet, and by the fact that Section 13, which lays down the procedure to be followed by the revenue authorities, makes no provision whatever for summoning the rest of the creditors on the application of one. I would therefore agree with the learned District Judge who considers in appeal that the agreement which ceases to subsist must be interpreted as being only the particular agreement between the particular creditor who applied and the debtor.

5. Even on the supposition that the agreement did entirely cease to subsist on 12-3-1940, it became on that day as if it were the decree of a civil Court, that is to say it will be a decree in favour of four decree-