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1946 Supreme(Nagpur) 21

HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
BHIWARA AND ORS – Appellant
Versus
RENUKA AND ORS – Respondent
Decided on : 15-03-1946

The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the term 'judgment' in Clause 10, Letters Patent, which was held to mean a decree in civil cases.

Headnote:

Judgment - Partition Suit - Clause 10, Letters Patent - [Clause 10, Letters Patent]

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiffs filed a suit for partition and separate possession of their share against the defendants. The trial Court passed a decree for partition, and during the pendency of the appeals, the plaintiffs applied for their share of profits from the property. The court appointed a receiver for the property.

Finding of the Court:

The court analyzed the meaning of 'judgment' in Clause 10, Letters Patent and concluded that the appeals were not tenable under this clause.

Issues: Interpretation of 'judgment' in Clause 10, Letters Patent

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that 'judgment' in Clause 10, Letters Patent means a decree in civil cases, and appeals would only be entertained if the judgment amounts to a decree.

Final Decision: The appeals were dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the costs of the other side.

JUDGMENT

1. The plaintiffs Abhiman and his sons filed a suit for partition and separate possession of their ⅓rd share against the defendants Bajirao, Duryodhan, and his sons. The wives of Bajirao were not joined as parties to the suit originally. The contention of the defendants was that the plaintiffs Abhiman and his sons were entitled only to one-fifth share in the property and not to one-third as claimed by them as the wives of Bajirao were also entitled to one-fifth share each. Bajirao died during the pendency of the suit and his widows were brought on record. The trial Court passed a decree for partition holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to one fifth share in the property and that each of the widows of Bajirao was also entitled to one-fifth share. Against this decision the plaintiffs preferred a first appeal, which is First Appeal No. 5 of 1942. The defendants also preferred an appeal against the decree, and that is First Appeal No. 90 of 1941.

2. During the pendency of these appeals the plaintiffs applied to the Court that the contending defendants in the case had agreed to give to the plaintiffs one-fifth share of the profits every year during the pendency of the suit and thus avoid the appointment of a receiver, but that the defendants failed to fulfil their promise and that it was therefore necessary that the plaintiffs-appellants should be given their share of the profits as per defendants' promise, failing which a receiver should be appointed for the property in dispute, in which the plaintiffs have admittedly a share and which share was being refused to them.

3. Some ladies who are parties to the litigation also applied to get profits to the extent of their shares. Those applications were placed before Bose J., sitting singly. He tried to persuade the defendants in possession to share the profits with the plaintiffs and the widows according to their admitted shares. As the defendants were not amenable the only course left open to the Judge was to appoint a receiver, and he appointed the appellant Abhiman receiver of the property, and directed him to pay profits to each according to his share after deducting the expenses.

4. As there were two applications in which the orders were passed, two appeals have been filed under Clause 10, Letters Patent, of this High Court.

5. Clause 10, Letters Patent, runs as under:

And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Nagpur from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the powers of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107, Government of India Act. or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108, Government of India Act,....

6. The office noted on these appeals that they were not tenable under this clause inasmuch as the order of Bose J., does not amount to a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10, Letters Patent. We have heard the parties at great length on this point, and we are of the opinion that these appeals are not tenable.

7. What is meant by the word 'judgment' in Clause 10, Letters Patent of our High Court and similar clauses in the Letters Patent of other High Courts, has been a matter of great controversy and numerous rulings have been given on the subject. In view of the controversy on the point a Divisional Bench of this High Court ruled in Eknathrao v. Gopalrao L.P.A. No. 3 of 1940 following the Privy Council case in Sevak Jeranchod Bhogilal v. Dakore Temple Committee, 1925 AIR(PC) 155, that the term 'judgment' in the Letters Patent of the High Court means in civil cases a decree and not a jud








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