The discretion of the lower Court in matters of security for costs is unqualified and can only be interfered with in exceptional circumstances.

Padhye, J—This order governs two Civil Revisions, i.e., civil Revision Nos. 151 and 152 of 1946. These are mainly between the same parties and involve the same question for decision.

2. On 4-12-1944 the plaintiff, who is non-applicant 1 in these revisions, instituted two suits. In Civil Suit No. 38-A of 1944, she claimed from her father (present applicant) and his transferees possession of immovable and movable property including ornaments and accounts of the usufruct of the property and of the amounts she from time to time advanced to her father, as demanded by him, for management of the property. Her case is that immovable property and movable property including ornaments belonged to her mother Saraswatibai, who died on 11-6-1934 leaving her as the only daughter and the nearest heir. Having inherited all this property solely, she allowed her father to possess and manage this entire property on his undertaking to get the property mutated in her name and to manage it in her interest and on her behalf. She also alleged that she advanced Rs. 4490 to her father as required by him in the course of management. By another suit, i.e., civil suit No. 40-A of 1944 she claimed possession and profits of immovable property which her father (present applicant) gifted in her favour fey a registered gift deed dated 11-10-1942 and which according to her he was managing on her behalf and in her interest.

3. It appears from the order-sheets that defendant 1 (applicant) and other defendants as well took an unusually long time to file their statements. The statement of defendant 1 was filed on 24-8-1945 and issues were struck on 18-10-1945. On 28-2-1946 and 4-3-1916 the defendants applied to the lower Court to call upon the plaintiff to furnish security for the defendants' costs. These applications were rejected by the lower Court and against those orders the present revisions are filed.

4. Mr. Bobde for the applicant contended that the orders of the lower Court should be interfered with in revision as the lower Court either failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it or it acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction with material irregularity. According to him the lower Court failed to take into consideration Sub-rule (3) of Order 25, Rule 1, Civil P.C., which mainly governed the disposal of these applications and further that the orders of the lower Court were not supportable even under the amended Order 25, Rule 1, Sub-rule (1) of the Code.

5. To begin with, the order under Order 25, Rule 1 is a purely discretionary order and that discretion is vested by Legislature in the trial Court. It was held in Calico Printers Association v. Jeewan Ram Ganga Ram & Co. that the discretion of the trial Court is unqualified and unfettered. Even if one does not go so far, it is apparent that the discretion of the first Court cannot be interfered with except in very exceptional circumstances amounting either to no exercise of discretion or to the exercise which is manifestly contrary to express provision of law or is otherwise arbitrary or perverse. A mere mistake in the exercise of discretion which it is within the jurisdiction of the lower Court to exercise would be no ground to interfere in revision: Devidas v. Nilkanthrao, 1936 AIR(Nag) 157. It will have to be seen if the question involved in the revisions falls within this narrow ambit. It is moreover necessary that the defendant who was fully aware of the plaintiff's financial status from the very beginning must invoke the jurisdiction of the Court with sufficient promptitude. An unexplained delay in applying often raises an inference of want of bona fides and disentitles a party to a discretionary relief: Vide Sachindra Nath v. Secy. of State, 1930 AIR(Cal) 520.

6. In the applications for security filed by the defendants, the suits of the plaintiff are nowhere described as suits for payment of money; on the other hand, the suits are described as for possession of immovable property. Even apart from