The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of Section 212, C.P. Land Revenue Act, and its applicability to the sale of rights in a survey number not situated in a raiyatwari village.

1. Hiralal and Sarjooprasad are first cousins their mothers being sisters. Their grandfather left them by will certain property including a Nazul plot situated in Bilaspur town which has been cultivated as a garden. This plot is now, in accordance with recent settlement instructions, entered as being held in the right of ryot Sarkar. The particular plot in dispute was left to both the parties jointly, and on 12th July 1921, Hiralal sold his half share in it to his cousin Sarjooprasad who on the same day, as he could not pay for it in cash, mortgaged the whole of the plot in Hiralal's favour. The money was to be paid within six years and if not paid there was a condition for sale. Nothing has been paid, and Hiralal sued on the basis of his mortgage in 1936. The claim for a simple money decree was time-barred as the suit was brought more than six years after the date fixed for the payment. The defendant pleaded that Nazul mourusi or ryot Sarkar rights are inalienable, that the mortgage was void ab initio and that the registration of the mortgage deed was obtained by fraud as the Sub-Registrar refused to register the mortgage bond which stated that the property was Nazul and accordingly any reference to Nazul was scored out. Both the Courts below held that the rights of a ryot in Nazul or ryot Sarkar land were not inalienable and that the defendant who had purchased a plot on the very date of the mortgage was not entitled to plead that they were inalienable, and also held that no fraud had been practised on the registration department. The lower appellate Court agreed with the trial Court in dismissing the claim on the ground that any decree given would be inoperative as Section 212(2), C.P. Land Revenue Act, laid down that the right in question could not be sold or foreclosed in execution of a decree. In view of the defendant's conduct, no costs were awarded to him either in the suit or as respondent in the appeal. The plaintiff has now preferred a second appeal.

2. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that should his claim fail by means of the provisions of the Land Revenue Act, nevertheless he should be given a decree, although sale might not be possible in execution, with the provision that a receiver of the plot should be appointed and the profits paid to him until his claim, which was for Rupees 4521-14-0, should be satisfied. Now, the appointment of a receiver on landed property is confined to the pendency of a suit or an appeal although in exceptional cases, vide the Privy Council decision in Mathusri Umamba Boyi Saiba v. Mathusri Dipamba Boyi Saiba,1896 19 ILR(Mad) 120, such direction in a final judgment is permissible. That ease dealt with the exceptional circumstances of female claimants to an estate where it had been found that all were to be supported out of the estate but that individual management by any one of them would waste the estate; that deviation from the ordinary principles cannot have any application here.

3. This particular plot with one or two others which were also cultivated as gardens, exist within the limits of Bilaspur town. The last malguzar owner surrendered his status as far back as 1862. Some of these garden plots have been recorded as in a raiyatwari village but the particular plots in question have not. At the time of the mortgage they were recorded as Nazul. At the subsequent settlement of 1925-1926, these plots were correctly described as ryot Sarkar. Between 1921 and 1925, they had been recorded as mourusi or occupancy and in the latter year it was laid down that they were to be treated as ryot Sarkar. The trial Court conceded that in 1921, there was no prohibition in respect of the transfer of rights in Nazul land and also that a transfer between the parties would be legal under Sub-section (1) of Section 212, Land Revenue Act, as the parties were sufficiently closely related, but held that the present law must be applied and that Sub-section (2) of that section prohibit