The main legal principle established in the judgment is the distinction between the powers of the High Court in revision and appeal, particularly in relation to questions of fact and law, and the interpretation of 'according to law' in the context of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and the Limitation Act.

Vivian Bose, J—This order refers to civil Revn. No. 715 of 1940 and Civil Revn. No. 152 of 1941. I think they are suitable cases to refer to a Bench of two or more Judges, (a Full Bench case is also involved) as my Lord the Chief Justice may direct, to enable the much debated question about the High Court's powers in Small Cause Court revisions to be authoritatively decided. Similar difficulties arise under Section 75, Provincial Insplvency Act, where the same phrase ''according to law'' is used. The two cases are substantial ones so far as Small Cause Court revisions go. The value in one is Rs. 400 and in the other Rs. 695. Also, one of them in particular, namely, civil Revision No. 715 of 1940, is to my mind suitable from another angle as well because, though I do not decide that at the moment as the whole question is whether I have power to go into the matter at all, the law appears to be all on one side while ''justice'' seems prima facie to be on the other. I say 'seems' advisedly because Judgea differ about the justice of the law of limitation. As to the position in revision generally, Judges take such widely differing views about their powers that it has become exceedingly difficult for both the Bench and the Bar to know where they stand. Single Judges are particularly affected because at every turn a decision which prima facie binds' them is, or can be, quoted. Some Judge at some time can always be found to have been lenient. (I have not been without fault myself). His decision operates as a precedent. Others follow him and then the flood gates are opened up until a position is reached when it becomes almost impossible for a Judge sitting alone to stem the tide.

2. Thus, there is a reported Nagpur decision which binds Single Judges which states that the High Court can interfere even with a pure finding of fact if the finding is based on ''little evidence.'' See Padamsi v. Sheshrao,1923 AIR(Nag) 292. This was followed in Harakchand v. G.I.P. Railway Co., 1927 AIR(Nag) 77 There is also a decision of mine under the Provincial Insolvency Act which, though it does not actually say so, appears to suggest that the High Court's powers in these revisions are wide. At any rate it is often quoted in support of such a position. The decision is Radhavallabh v. Awachit In addition there is a Full Bench case, Vishwanath v. Sadasheo, 1932 AIR(Nag) 1 which interfered in a Small Cause Court's revision on a point of limitation. Then again, on this very question of limitation there is at least one reported decision which decides that interference is possible even in revisions under Section 115, Civil P.C.: Laxmandas v. Chunnilal This, read with my decision in Radhavallabh v. Awachit and the Full Bench makes it obligatory on Single Judges to entertain such questions in Small Cause Court revisions and in revisions under the Provincial Insolvency Act. It is true I took a different view in Devidas v. Nilkanthrao, 1936 AIR(Nag) 157 but even so there is a conflict between two Single Judges which requires to be resolved. And, if revisions can be entertained, on questions of limitation, why not on other questions of law? Where is the line to be drawn? What is there particularly sacred about limitation? It will be observed that in Laxmandas v. Chunnilal the law of limitation was applied in revision to defeat a claim which the lower Court had considered ''just'' on the merits or so we must presume-at any rate it had allowed the claim.

3. The facts in Civil Revision No. 715 of 1940 are as follows: (I do not intend to set out the facts in the other revision as they are not really necessary. It is enough to say that similar questions, namely, deposit or loan, and the law of limitation, are involved.) The plaintiff sues for recovery of a sum of Rs. 400 which, according to the plaint, he deposited with the defendant for safe custody. The deposit is not said to have been subject to any terms but, according to the plaintiff, demands ''from time to t