The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of strict proof and close investigation in divorce and nullity proceedings, the limitations of affidavit evidence in matrimonial cases, and the need to prevent collusion.

1. Pollock, Vivian Bose and Digby, JJ. (dated 15th July 1942)-This is a proceeding under Section 20, Divorce Act, for confirmation of a decree of nullity of marriage made by the District Judge of Nagpur. The case is a very unusual one. The parties were married at Bombay under the Special Marriage Act (Act 3 of 1872) on 18th September 1940. Exhibit P-1 is the certificate of marriage. Section 17 of the Act applies the Divorce Act to all such marriages and states that a decree of nullity can be given for the causes mentioned in the Divorce Act. The cause set forth here is impotence (Section 19) and a decree is sought under Section 18. The case is unusual in that the husband seeks the decree and that each spouse accuses the other of impotence vis-a-vis himself and herself. Neither admits general impotence. The husband says that the wife is so hysterical that any sexual approach induces a fit of hysteria in her and renders consummation impossible. He places the whole blame on her. He is silent about her accusation of post-marital impotency in himself vis-a-vis her.

2. The wife says that in the beginning the husband was ''so profuse in his marital effusion as to be almost cruel'' to her. This developed such a horror of coitus in her that any sexual approach by the husband at once induced ''coldness,'' ''frigidity'' and ''hysteria.'' She adds that her frigidity has now communicated itself to the husband and has made him impotent vis-a-vis her. The husband is silent about his present state. We are told by counsel that it is the case of both parties that the marriage has never been consummated, but that is not as clear as it might and ought to have been in the statement and affidavit of the petitioner. The wife's affidavit states that there has been no consummation, though exactly what she means by her reference to the cruelty and effusion of her husband's initial marital approach she does not explain. All this is unusual enough but the learned District Judge has made the case even more unusual by dispensing with evidence on oath from the witness box even though both parties were present in Court and could without difficulty have entered the box and given evidence, and proceeding instead on two affidavits one by the husband and the other by the wife. These affidavits have quite evidently been drafted by counsel and are for the most part, with slight variations, a verbatim repetition of the petition and the written statement. The learned Judge has not explained why he contented himself with affidavit evidence, especially when both sides were present in Court, but we infer from certain passages in the judgment that his reasons were (1) ''that there can be no other evidence than that of the parties,'' (2) that ''it is improbable that persons comparatively recently married would come before the Court with such assertions unless there was truth in them,'' and (3) that the story can be accepted because ''the statements in the petition are admitted by the respondent.''

3. In our opinion, an important question of principle is involved here. Section 47, Divorce Act, provides that statements in the petition which have been duly verified may be referred to as evidence at the hearing, and the proviso to Section 51 states that ''the parties shall be at liberty to verify their respective cases in whole or in part by affidavit.'' The Act consequently enables facts to be proved by affidavit evidence, and in extreme cases, perhaps even by verified statements, (though we do not decide that). But so does the Code of Civil Procedure. In spite of that, however, affidavit evidence is rarely accepted in Courts of law on matters which require proof, except on interlocutory matters or on subsidiary questrons, and even then it is usual to require regular proof when there is contest. In our opinion the rule should be applied no less strictly in matrimonial cases.

4. We gather that what weighed with the learned Judge is the fact that the petition is not oppo