The court invoked its inherent jurisdiction to enforce the liability of the supratdar, emphasizing that the custodian or supratdar is subject to the jurisdiction of the court.

Pollock—This is an application for revision arising out of proceedings under section 192 of the Indian Succession Act. One Sitaram died leaving some estate which his sister Mst. Anandabai and her sons Sadasheo and others claim as heirs of the deceased Sitaram by virtue of a will dated 6-5-1938. Letters of administration in respect of that will have been granted to Sadasheo. On an application by Sadasheo and his brothers under section 192 the Court directed the nazir to take possession of the property and certain movable property is said to be handed over into the possession of Tukaram as supratdar. He executed a supratnama dated 30-9-1939. After letters of administration had been granted to Sadasheo the learned District Judge directed Tukaram to return this property, but he failed to do so. Sadasheo thereupon asked that the order should be enforced by the attachment of his property, but Tukaram contended and the Court held that the Court had no jurisdiction to enquire into the liability of the supratdar in these proceedings and that Sadasheo had another remedy by way of filing a regular suit. Against that decision Sadasheo has filed this application for revision.

2. It was held by majority of the Judges in Ko Maung Gvi and others v. Daw Tok, 1928 AIR(Rang) 249. that section 145 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply to proceedings under the Indian Succession Act as such proceedings are not suits or proceedings consequent thereon. That view appears to me to be probably correct, but I can see no reason why in a case of this sort the Court should not invoke its inherent jurisdiction to make the enquiry asked for. The property was originally in the custody of the Court and it was it is said handed over by that Court to Tukaram on his undertaking to return it to the Court when ordered to do so. Tukaram's case is that he never actually took possession of the property and that Mst. Gujabai (Sitaram's widow) was allowed to remain in possession and has since removed the property, but for the purpose of deciding whether the Court has jurisdiction the facts alleged by Sadasheo must be assumed to be true. The principles that should apply in the case of this sort were stated in Ramji v. Ziblaji, 1924 AIR(Nag) 258.

3. Regarding the property attached as being in custodia legis we say that the depositary or custodian having been entrusted with it by the order of the Court, it is in the fitness of things that he should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, and also be legally compellable to produce it whenever ordered by it to do so, as if he were an officer of the Court. If he owes his position, as also his authority to possess the said property to the authority which created him or delegated that authority to him it stands to reason that he should not be permitted to ignore any order for production or re-delivery, issuing from that very authority, and set it at nought and thus drive it to the necessity of filing a regular suit against him for that purpose.

4. The Court went on to say that if section 145 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply then the inherent jurisdiction of the Court should be invoked to pass any orders necessary for the ends of justice or in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to shorten litigation, and added We do not think that a custodian or supratdar is such a being as cannot be brought under or be made amenable to such inherent jurisdiction.

5. The learned District Judge stated that the inherent jurisdiction could not be invoked because the remedy of filing a regular suit was open to Sadasheo. Inherent jurisdiction may be invoked by the Court to enable it to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and as was pointed out in Ramji v. Ziblaji1 to shorten the litigation. I, therefore, hold that the lower Court had jurisdiction to enforce the liability of the supratdar in the proceedings before it, and the fact