The central legal point established in the judgment is that a civil court, when considering an application under Section 476, Criminal P.C., remains governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and cannot compel accused persons to give evidence against themselves or produce documents against their own interests.

Gruer, J—This is an application under Section 115, Civil P.C. In the course of an inquiry under Section 476, Criminal P. C, the Second Subordinate Judge, Second Class, Nagpur, has decided that the Court can examine the present applicants on oath in these proceedings and call on them to produce document a which are in their possession. The issuing of a summons under Section 94, Criminal P.C., was ordered against them. The non-applicant Mukta had movecll the Court to take action against them for giving false evidence in Misc. Case No. 47 of 1935 of that civil Court. Applicant 1, Bishambhardas, was a party, viz., an objector, in these proceedings, while the two other applicants were his witnesses. Bishambhardas's objection was dismissed, as was his appeal to the Additional District Judge. Both sides then preferred appeals to the High Court. In March 1939 both appeals were dismissed as withdrawn without leave to file future appeals.

2. In his reply to the application under Section 476, Criminal P.C., Bishambhardas said that in the appeal preferred to the High Court the parties compromised the claim and hence the objection and appeal were dismissed; he added that as the case was compromised no application as the one made lay. This plea is again argued before me, and it is said that in these circumstances the application to prosecute is an abuse of the process of the Court, and it should have been dismissed forthwith. I find however that in reply it was denied by the other side that the appeal was compromised; Bishambhardas withdrew his appeal unconditionally. The copy of the order dismissing the appeal certainly makes no mention of compromise. The point is not yet taken up by the lower Court, and it is not proper for me to go into it, especially when the facts about the compromise are in dispute. What was argued as a preliminary point on 20th July 1940 was whether the present applicants should be compelled to give evidence and produce documents in these proceedings in spite of their objection. The order is confined to these points. If the inquiry is to go on, the learned Judge will doubtless consider the other point in due course.

3. Learned counsel's objection to the procedure adopted is that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to act under Section 94, Criminal P.C., although conducted in accordance with Section 476, Criminal P.C., the inquiry is by a civil Court, and Section 94 of the Code is not available to it; further the applicants are in the position of accused persons, and the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code requiring parties to give evidence and produce documents do not apply to them. Comment is also made on the delay in making the application. But here again, that is not a point taken up in the order. The other side had pointed out that it had to wait until the appeal was decided, and asserts that it acted with reasonable promptitude thereafter. In Kumaravel Nadar v. Shanmuga Nadar, 1940 AIR(Mad) 465 a Pull Bench held that a civil Court does not cease to be a civil Court when it is considering an application made to it under Section 476, Criminal P.C., and if for purposes of that application it remains a civil Court it must be governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and not by those of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is in accordance with that view that an application in revision against the order of a civil Court acting under Section 476, Criminal P.C., is preferred under Section 115, Civil P.C., like the present one. It would follow from the above that the lower Court could not take action under Section 94, Criminal P.C. No doubt, a civil Court has power to issue summons for attendance and production of documents; but the penalties for disobedience would be different, for instance, dismissal of suit or striking out of the defence. In Munisamy Mudaliar v. Rajaratnam Pillai, 1922 AIR(Mad) 495 Coutts-Trotter, J. observed that it was unfair to order plaintiff to produce a document for the sole pu