The main legal point established in the judgment is that sale proceedings are only vitiated by want of jurisdiction or failure to comply with essential provisions of law for proper publicity.

Binney, J—The important facts in this case are as follows. Mouza Khairgaon was to be sold in land revenue recovery proceedings on the 4th January 1941. The sale was to be free of encumbrances. The sale was not held as, according to the Tahsildar, no bids were offered. On the application of the appellant mortgagee, the Tahsildar issued a fresh proclamation for sale subject to encumbrances. At the same time, he asked for formal sanction of his action. This was given by the Deputy Commissioner on the 25th January 1941, and the property was knocked down to the appellant on the 10th February 1941. Objections made by the respondent Receiver were rejected by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the sale was confirmed. The Deputy Commissioner held that the proceedings were illegal and the Commissioner agreed with this view.

2. The learned Commissioner was influenced by a decision of this court reported in R.S. Bhayyalal Tiwari v. Gangaprasad, 19 N.L.J 299. But there is a vital difference in the facts of the two cases. In that case, the sale took place without the sanction of proper authority. In the present case, when the sale was held proper sanction had been given. The issue is whether the fact that the proclamation was issued by the Tahsildar, before he had authority to sell the property in the manner specified in the proclamation, invalidates the sale. There are no decisions on this particular point. But the trend of case law is that sale proceedings are only vitiated by want of jurisdiction or by failure to comply with the provisions of law essential to proper publicity. Here there was no question of failure of publicity and the sale was held under proper authority. Weight must also be attached to the fact that the Tahsildar's action was ratified by the Deputy Commissioner. In the circumstances, I do not consider that anything more than an irregularity was committed and I can see no justification for the finding that a sale by public auction properly advertised is void because the officer signing the proclamation had not, at the time of the issue of the proclamation, authority to insert certain conditions which were subsequently approved by the Deputy Commissioner.

3. The question then arises whether the sale should have been set aside under section 146, Central Provinces Land Revenue Act. The objector had to show that he had sustained substantial injury by such irregularity. The learned Deputy Commissioner considered that ''it is not impossible that had a proclamation subject to encumbrances been issued, after the sanction of such a sale by the Deputy Commissioner giving sufficient time before the date of sale, the receiver or some of the creditors would have been able to bring their objections before this or any other court and could have got the rather unusual order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and the Sub-Divisional Officer corrected. In the absence of a legal proclamation they must be held not to have been given a proper opportunity to do so.'' I cannot follow this reasoning. The sale was not held until five weeks after the Tahsildar's order of the 4th January 1941 and surely there was sufficient time to make such objections. It has been urged that the sale with encumbrances has caused loss to the other creditors whom the respondent represents. That may be so. But counsel has been unable to show how any loss can be ascribed to the fact that when the Tahsildar issued the proclamation, he was anticipating the Deputy Commissioner's sanction to sell subject to encumbrances. It must be noted that there had been sanction for a previous sale subject to encumbrances. So the obtaining of sanction on this occasion was little more than a formality.

4. I set aside the orders of the appellate courts and restore the order of Sub-Divisional Officer confirming the sale.