The central legal point established in the judgment is the entitlement of adopted sons to their share in joint family property, emphasizing the continuity of the family line and the impact of partition and reunion on coparcenary rights.

1. This appeal raises a number of points, one of which is of considerable importance. The points can best be under, stood when the following facts have been stated: The following genealogical tree shows the relationship:

DEWAJI (dead) | ______________________________________ | | Tukaram Bhagirathi = Bakaram = Yamuna (died 1891) (died 1921)(died 22-10-1918)(died 1935) | | Bajirao Shankar = Parvati (Defendant 1) (died 14-9-1913) | | | Ramkrishna (Plaintiff) | (adopted on 17-12-1936) | __________________ | _____________________________ | | Narayan (deft. 2) Rangrao (deft. 3)

2. It should be added that the group, Bajirao, Narayan and ''Bangrao, (forming the family composed of a father and two sons in the Tukaram line) separated on 16th September 1912 from the Bakaram group. But this did not result in the parties for ever being divided because there was a reunion in 1914, that is to say, after the death of Bakaram's son, Shankar. Thus from 1914 to the death of Bakaram in 1918 the Bakaram line and the Bajirao line were joint. There was a partition on 19th September 1936, after Bakaram's death and before Ramkrishna's adoption, when the members of the joint Hindu family springing from Dewaji were all dead except Bajirao, Narayan and Bangrao (and may be their womenfolk, a matter that was not regarded as relevant) of the Tukaram line and widow Parvatibai of the Bakaram line. Of these the appellants stress the fact that Parvatibai was not a coparcener but a mere maintenance-holder. Accordingly it is said that at the date of the partition, 19th September 1936, the only coparceners in this joint Hindu family were defendants 1, 2 and 3, and that as a consequence of their separation they had brought the coparcenary for ever to an end and that accordingly (1) Parvatibai's power to adopt was at an end, alternatively, (2) if she had power to adopt, Ramkrishna obtained no property because he was adopted into the family of Dewaji at a time when that coparcenary had been brought to an end, alternatively at a time when it had been divested of all the joint family property by that property losing its quality of jointness by division amongst the surviving coparceners on separation. In other words, on either view, when Bam-krishna was adopted there was no share in the family property that he could claim. This is a point of importance.

3. Next it is urged that after the death of Bakaram certain properties were acquired out of the profits of the joint family property. It is said that when the only coparceners were defendants 1, 2 and 3 they were not accountable to anybody for profits. Accordingly if they spent those profits and acquired any land that land, it is argued, became their self-acquired property. Finally there is a supplementary point taken: that on a true construction of the deed of adoption the plaintiff's right of suit, if any, became postponed until after the life of the widow and that he has no present right of j action. This last point to be understood requires it to be stated that the suit is for partition and possession, that in the deed of adoption the adopting mother reserved to herself very wide powers over the property during her lifetime. She was to be, during her lifetime, in exclusive possession. She was to have power to manage, of course, as regards the share of the Bakaram branch. Accordingly, it is said that, as she is still alive, she is the person who is entitled to possession. Seeing that this suit is brought by her adopted son, a minor, and that she is his next friend, we regard this as a highly technical point, of no merit, and we should have put the matter right, if need be, by adding her in her proper capacity as plain, tiff in addition to her being on the record already in her capacity as next friend to the minor. On the court indicating that, seeing that leave in any event was required to urge this ground of appeal (which leave we indicated would not be given excepting on the above terms which would render the