Interpretation of fiscal enactments and precedent on fixed fees for similar suits are crucial in determining the appropriate court-fee for specific types of suits.

Clark—This is an application by the plaintiffs for revision of the order of the Additional District Judge, Seoni, requiring them to pay ad valorem court-fee on Rs. 10,244 instead of the fixed court-fee of Rs. 15 which they have paid on their plaint. The applicants' suit, as set out in the plaint, is for a declaration that an award made by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies dated 13th September 1938 is ultra vires, the matter which he decided by the said award being outside his jurisdiction and within the jurisdiction of the regular civil Court. The award in question directs the payment by the applicants to the non-applicant-defendant of Rupees 10,244-1-9. The learned Judge has held that ad valorem court-fee must be paid on this amount as the suit is one for a declaration with consequential relief falling under S. 7 (iv) (c), Court-fees Act.

2. The reasoning of the learned Judge is that, according to R. 33 of the rules made-by the Provincial Government under S. 43, Co-operative Societies Act (2 of 1912) to be found at p. 20 of the Co-operative Manual, an award is a decree the setting aside of which is a relief consequent upon the declaration that it is invalid, for which the plaintiffs have asked, and he has relied on Devidas v. Ramlal, Baldeoprasad v. Ghasiram,1920 AIR(Nag) 243 Baburao v. Balajirao, 1929 AIR(Nag) 71 and Arunachalam Chatty v. Rangasawmy Pillai, 1915 AIR(Mad) 948 for holding that in such cases plaints are to be stamped ad valorem. To those cases the learned Advocate-General, who represents the non-applicant, has added Noksing v. Bholusing, 1930 AIR(Nag) 73 Secretary of State v. Baij Nath,1932 AIR(Oudh) 224 Dattaji v. Mt. Bhagirathi, 1939 ILR(Nag) 373 and Baboo Raja v. Sadaabiv,1940 NLJ 96, Devidas v. Ramlal, Baburao v. Balajirao, 1929 AIR(Nag) 71 Deokali Koer v. Kedar Nath and Baboo Raja v. Sadaabiv,1940 NLJ 96 relate to the setting aside of documents and not to the setting aside of a decree or award. They can therefore be easily distinguished. Baldeoprasad v. Ghasiram,1920 AIR(Nag) 243 Arunachalam Chatty v. Rangasawmy Pillai, 1915 AIR(Mad) 948 and Dattaji v. Mt. Bhagirathi, 1939 ILR(Nag) 373 relate to decrees. Noksing v. Bholusing, 1930 AIR(Nag) 73 is a case where an adoption was sought to be set aside. The only case of all those mentioned above, in which an award was sought to be set aside, and in which it was held that ad valorem court-fee was necessary is Secretary of State v. Baij Nath,1932 AIR(Oudh) 224. Accordingly if the learned Additional District Judge is correct in saying that under Rule 33 of the Co-operative Societies Rules the award of the Registrar is a decree, then he is right to hold on the authority in Baldeoprasad v. Ghasiram,1920 AIR(Nag) 243, and Arunachalam Chatty v. Rangasawmy Pillai, 1915 AIR(Mad) 948 that ad valorem court-fee is necessary, but Rule 33 does not say that an award by the Registrar is a decree. What the rule says is that any award, decision or order mentioned in R. 32 shall, on application to such Court (civil Court), be enforced in the same manner as a decree of such Court.

3. The rule therefore recognises that the award, decision or order is not a decree. That being so, those cases, which hold that a suit for a declaration that a decree is not binding must be stamped ad valorem are also distinguishable. Therefore the only case of those mentioned above which has to be considered by reason of its reference to the setting aside of an award is Secretary of State v. Baij Nath,1932 AIR(Oudh) 224. To that may be added In re Assistant Commissioner of Labour, 1924 AIR(Mad) 489 and Secretary of State v. K.S. Bannerjee, 1927 AIR(Cal) 45. All these are cases under the Land Acquisition Act in which the land acquisition officer awarded compensation and on an appeal against the amount of compensation awarded it was held that the decision of the lower Court was a decree and therefore ad valorem court-fee was payable; but under the Land Acquisition Act, S. 26 (2) every award und