JUDGMENT

Abdul-Raoof, J. - The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised as below:

2. On the 31st August, 1920, the Firm of Darshan Ram-Ganesh Das brought a suit against the Firm of Khair Din-Allah Bakhsh for the recovery of Rs. 3,250. The 7th October, 1920, was fixed for final hearing. On that date the parties put in a compromise, and a decree was passed in accordance with the terms of the compromise. The judgment-debtors were ordered to pay the decretal amount by certain instalments. One Fateh Mohamed stood surety for the performance of the agreement relating to the payment by instalments. It appears that an attachment of the property of the defendants had been effected before judgment. The decree, therefore, provided that the property already under attachment must continue to remain under attachment until the realization of the decretal amount, and, further, that in case the amount was not realized from the judgment-debtors, it was to be realized from Fateh Mohamed, the surety. Apparently, after the decree, on the same date, an application was put in by Abdullah and others of the defendant firm asking the Courts permission to effect mortgage and sate of the hypothecated property, and pay the proceeds into Court to the credit of the decree-holders. This led to the present dispute. The decree-holders sought to recover the first instalment from Fateh Mohamed, and the latter applied to the Court on the 20th June to be relieved of his liability as surety, as the decree-holders and the principal judgment-debtors had brought about a change in the original agreement without his consent or knowledge. This application has been allowed by the Court below, and Fatch Mohamed has been absolved from his liability as a surety.

3. The decree-holders have appealed against the order of the lower Court and have contended, firstly, that no change has taken place in the original undertaking and the things are still the same as they were before; and, secondly, that the application for permission to effect mortgages and sales privately had already been made and granted before the surety undertook the liability.

4. As regards the second contention, I may at once observe that there is nothing on the record to justify this assertion. Having regard to the various applications made on the 7th October, 1920, and the orders passed thereon, the only legitimate conclusion that is possible is' that the application for permission was made after the decree had been passed. This contention may, therefore, at once be dismissed.

5. As regards the first contention, it is idle to contend that no change has taken place. When the surety undertook the liability to pay, the entire property belonging to the judgment-debtors was under attachment and the surety must have felt secure when he undertook the liability. The moment permission was granted to the judgment-debtors to effect private mortgages or sales the whole position was changed, and, in my opinion, the surety was justified in applying to the Court to be relieved of his undertaking. There is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs.